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Message-ID: <1263348271.3852.74.camel@localhost>
Date: Wed, 13 Jan 2010 02:04:31 +0000
From: Ben Hutchings <ben@...adent.org.uk>
To: "Brandeburg, Jesse" <jesse.brandeburg@...el.com>
Cc: Neil Horman <nhorman@...driver.com>, davem@...emloft.net,
"netdev@...r.kernel.org" <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
"Kirsher, Jeffrey T" <jeffrey.t.kirsher@...el.com>,
"Allan, Bruce W" <bruce.w.allan@...el.com>,
"Waskiewicz Jr, Peter P" <peter.p.waskiewicz.jr@...el.com>,
"Ronciak, John" <john.ronciak@...el.com>,
"e1000-devel@...ts.sourceforge.net"
<e1000-devel@...ts.sourceforge.net>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] e1000: enhance frame fragment detection
On Tue, 2010-01-12 at 17:56 -0800, Brandeburg, Jesse wrote:
> On Wed, 6 Jan 2010, Brandeburg, Jesse wrote:
> > a counter patch, without atomic ops, since we are protected by napi when
> > modifying this variable.
> >
> > Originally From: Neil Horman <nhorman@...driver.com>
> > Modified by: Jesse Brandeburg <jesse.brandeburg@...el.com>
> >
> > <original message>
> > Hey all-
> > A security discussion was recently given:
> > http://events.ccc.de/congress/2009/Fahrplan//events/3596.en.html
> > And a patch that I submitted awhile back was brought up. Apparently some of
> > their testing revealed that they were able to force a buffer fragment in e1000
> > in which the trailing fragment was greater than 4 bytes. As a result the
> > fragment check I introduced failed to detect the fragement and a partial
> > invalid frame was passed up into the network stack. I've written this patch
> > to correct it. I'm in the process of testing it now, but it makes good
> > logical sense to me. Effectively it maintains a per-adapter state variable
> > which detects a non-EOP frame, and discards it and subsequent non-EOP frames
> > leading up to _and_ _including_ the next positive-EOP frame (as it is by
> > definition the last fragment). This should prevent any and all partial frames
> > from entering the network stack from e1000.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Jesse Brandeburg <jesse.brandeburg@...el.com>
>
> I would like to withdraw this patch, at least for 2.6.32+ e1000 and e1000e
> are both not susceptible to this attack. We have verified the below with
> testing, including code modifications to guarantee the correct paths were
> taken when receiving overlong frames.
[...]
> I believe RedHat has not backported this patch, and kernels <= 2.6.31
> still need the fix, so both need some version of this workaround, but
> 2.6.32 does not.
[...]
There's also the 2.6.27 stable series, and several long-term supported
distributions. I'm particularly interested in getting a patch for
Debian 5.0's kernel based on 2.6.26. Please advise what would be a
suitable change for the older kernel versions.
Ben.
--
Ben Hutchings
The generation of random numbers is too important to be left to chance.
- Robert Coveyou
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