Date:	Wed, 28 Apr 2010 10:17:48 -0400
From:	Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@...com>
To:	Neil Horman <nhorman@...driver.com>
CC:	sri@...ibm.com, linux-sctp@...r.kernel.org, eteo@...hat.com,
	netdev@...r.kernel.org, davem@...emloft.net, security@...nel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH]: sctp: Fix skb_over_panic resulting from multiple invalid
 parameter errors (CVE-2010-1173)



Vlad Yasevich wrote:
> I have this patch and a few others already queued.

Scratch that.  I totally misread the description and the patch.

-vlad
> 
> I was planning on sending these today for stable.
> 
> Here is the full list of stable patches I have:
> 
> sctp: Fix oops when sending queued ASCONF chunks
> sctp: fix to calc the INIT/INIT-ACK chunk length correctly is set
> sctp: per_cpu variables should be in bh_disabled section
> sctp: fix potential reference of a freed pointer
> sctp: avoid irq lock inversion while call sk->sk_data_ready()
> 
> -vlad
> 
> Neil Horman wrote:
>> Hey-
>> 	Recently, it was reported to me that the kernel could oops in the
>> following way:
>>
>> <5> kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:91!
>> <5> invalid operand: 0000 [#1]
>> <5> Modules linked in: sctp netconsole nls_utf8 autofs4 sunrpc iptable_filter
>> ip_tables cpufreq_powersave parport_pc lp parport vmblock(U) vsock(U) vmci(U)
>> vmxnet(U) vmmemctl(U) vmhgfs(U) acpiphp dm_mirror dm_mod button battery ac md5
>> ipv6 uhci_hcd ehci_hcd snd_ens1371 snd_rawmidi snd_seq_device snd_pcm_oss
>> snd_mixer_oss snd_pcm snd_timer snd_page_alloc snd_ac97_codec snd soundcore
>> pcnet32 mii floppy ext3 jbd ata_piix libata mptscsih mptsas mptspi mptscsi
>> mptbase sd_mod scsi_mod
>> <5> CPU:    0
>> <5> EIP:    0060:[<c02bff27>]    Not tainted VLI
>> <5> EFLAGS: 00010216   (2.6.9-89.0.25.EL) 
>> <5> EIP is at skb_over_panic+0x1f/0x2d
>> <5> eax: 0000002c   ebx: c033f461   ecx: c0357d96   edx: c040fd44
>> <5> esi: c033f461   edi: df653280   ebp: 00000000   esp: c040fd40
>> <5> ds: 007b   es: 007b   ss: 0068
>> <5> Process swapper (pid: 0, threadinfo=c040f000 task=c0370be0)
>> <5> Stack: c0357d96 e0c29478 00000084 00000004 c033f461 df653280 d7883180
>> e0c2947d 
>> <5>        00000000 00000080 df653490 00000004 de4f1ac0 de4f1ac0 00000004
>> df653490 
>> <5>        00000001 e0c2877a 08000800 de4f1ac0 df653490 00000000 e0c29d2e
>> 00000004 
>> <5> Call Trace:
>> <5>  [<e0c29478>] sctp_addto_chunk+0xb0/0x128 [sctp]
>> <5>  [<e0c2947d>] sctp_addto_chunk+0xb5/0x128 [sctp]
>> <5>  [<e0c2877a>] sctp_init_cause+0x3f/0x47 [sctp]
>> <5>  [<e0c29d2e>] sctp_process_unk_param+0xac/0xb8 [sctp]
>> <5>  [<e0c29e90>] sctp_verify_init+0xcc/0x134 [sctp]
>> <5>  [<e0c20322>] sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init+0x83/0x28e [sctp]
>> <5>  [<e0c25333>] sctp_do_sm+0x41/0x77 [sctp]
>> <5>  [<c01555a4>] cache_grow+0x140/0x233
>> <5>  [<e0c26ba1>] sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv+0xc5/0x108 [sctp]
>> <5>  [<e0c2b863>] sctp_inq_push+0xe/0x10 [sctp]
>> <5>  [<e0c34600>] sctp_rcv+0x454/0x509 [sctp]
>> <5>  [<e084e017>] ipt_hook+0x17/0x1c [iptable_filter]
>> <5>  [<c02d005e>] nf_iterate+0x40/0x81
>> <5>  [<c02e0bb9>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x151
>> <5>  [<c02e0c7f>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xc6/0x151
>> <5>  [<c02d0362>] nf_hook_slow+0x83/0xb5
>> <5>  [<c02e0bb2>] ip_local_deliver+0x1a2/0x1a9
>> <5>  [<c02e0bb9>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x151
>> <5>  [<c02e103e>] ip_rcv+0x334/0x3b4
>> <5>  [<c02c66fd>] netif_receive_skb+0x320/0x35b
>> <5>  [<e0a0928b>] init_stall_timer+0x67/0x6a [uhci_hcd]
>> <5>  [<c02c67a4>] process_backlog+0x6c/0xd9
>> <5>  [<c02c690f>] net_rx_action+0xfe/0x1f8
>> <5>  [<c012a7b1>] __do_softirq+0x35/0x79
>> <5>  [<c0107efb>] handle_IRQ_event+0x0/0x4f
>> <5>  [<c01094de>] do_softirq+0x46/0x4d
>>
>> Its an skb_over_panic BUG halt that results from processing an init chunk in
>> which too many of its variable length parameters are in some way malformed.
>>
>> The problem is in sctp_process_unk_param:
>> if (NULL == *errp)
>> 	*errp = sctp_make_op_error_space(asoc, chunk,
>> 					 ntohs(chunk->chunk_hdr->length));
>>
>> 	if (*errp) {
>> 		sctp_init_cause(*errp, SCTP_ERROR_UNKNOWN_PARAM,
>> 				 WORD_ROUND(ntohs(param.p->length)));
>> 		sctp_addto_chunk(*errp,
>> 			WORD_ROUND(ntohs(param.p->length)),
>> 				  param.v);
>>
>> When we allocate an error chunk, we assume that the worst case scenario requires
>> that we have chunk_hdr->length data allocated, which would be correct nominally,
>> given that we call sctp_addto_chunk for the violating parameter.  Unfortunately,
>> we also, in sctp_init_cause insert a sctp_errhdr_t structure into the error
>> chunk, so the worst case situation in which all parameters are in violation
>> requires chunk_hdr->length+(sizeof(sctp_errhdr_t)*param_count) bytes of data.
>>
>> The result of this error is that a deliberately malformed packet sent to a
>> listening host can cause a remote DOS, described in CVE-2010-1173:
>> http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2010-1173
>>
>> I've tested the below fix and confirmed that it fixes the issue.  It
>> pre-allocates the error chunk in sctp_verify_init, where we are able to count
>> the total number of variable length parameters, so we know how many error
>> headers we might need.  Then we simply use that chunk, if we find an error, or
>> discard/free it if all the parameters are valid.  Applies on top of the
>> lksctp-dev tree
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@...driver.com>
>>
>>
>>  sm_make_chunk.c |   24 ++++++++++++++++++++++--
>>  1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>>
>>
>> diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
>> index f592163..990457b 100644
>> --- a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
>> +++ b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
>> @@ -2134,6 +2134,8 @@ int sctp_verify_init(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
>>  	union sctp_params param;
>>  	int has_cookie = 0;
>>  	int result;
>> +	unsigned int param_cnt;
>> +	unsigned int len;
>>  
>>  	/* Verify stream values are non-zero. */
>>  	if ((0 == peer_init->init_hdr.num_outbound_streams) ||
>> @@ -2149,6 +2151,7 @@ int sctp_verify_init(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
>>  
>>  		if (SCTP_PARAM_STATE_COOKIE == param.p->type)
>>  			has_cookie = 1;
>> +		param_cnt++;
>>  
>>  	} /* for (loop through all parameters) */
>>  
>> @@ -2169,6 +2172,20 @@ int sctp_verify_init(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
>>  		return sctp_process_missing_param(asoc, SCTP_PARAM_STATE_COOKIE,
>>  						  chunk, errp);
>>  
>> +	if (!*errp) {
>> +		/*
>> +		 * Pre-allocate the error packet here
>> +		 * we do this as we need to reserve space
>> +		 * for the worst case scenario in which 
>> +		 * every parameter is in error and needs 
>> +		 * an errhdr attached to it
>> +		 */
>> +		len = ntohs(chunk->chunk_hdr->length);
>> +		len += sizeof(sctp_errhdr_t)*param_cnt;
>> +
>> +		*errp = sctp_make_op_error_space(asoc, chunk, len);
>> +	}
>> +
>>  	/* Verify all the variable length parameters */
>>  	sctp_walk_params(param, peer_init, init_hdr.params) {
>>  
>> @@ -2176,9 +2193,11 @@ int sctp_verify_init(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
>>  		switch (result) {
>>  		    case SCTP_IERROR_ABORT:
>>  		    case SCTP_IERROR_NOMEM:
>> -				return 0;
>>  		    case SCTP_IERROR_ERROR:
>> -				return 1;
>> +				len = ntohs((*errp)->chunk_hdr->length);
>> +				if ((*errp) && (len == sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t)))
>> +					sctp_chunk_free(*errp);
>> +				return (result == SCTP_IERROR_ERROR) ? 1 : 0;
>>  		    case SCTP_IERROR_NO_ERROR:
>>  		    default:
>>  				break;
>> @@ -2186,6 +2205,7 @@ int sctp_verify_init(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
>>  
>>  	} /* for (loop through all parameters) */
>>  
>> +	sctp_chunk_free(*errp);
>>  	return 1;
>>  }
>>  
>> --
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>>
> 
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