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Message-ID: <1273176614.2222.21.camel@edumazet-laptop>
Date: Thu, 06 May 2010 22:10:14 +0200
From: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@...il.com>
To: Neil Horman <nhorman@...driver.com>
Cc: netdev@...r.kernel.org, davem@...emloft.net, kuznet@....inr.ac.ru,
jmorris@...ei.org, yoshfuji@...ux-ipv6.org, kaber@...sh.net
Subject: Re: [PATCH] ipv4: remove ip_rt_secret timer
> Doing that doesn't solve my aim however, which is to avoid performing rt_genid
> updates when no one is attacking you at all. I completely agree that we can
> start the gen_id at some random value (by forcing an initial invalidation),
> however. Beyond that however, if someone is managing to guess our secret value,
> then we need to make our secret value more complex to determine. Perhaps given
> the reduction in the number of times we need to iterate our gen_id with the
> timer gone, we can use something more heavyweight to determine the the hash
> secret (the cprng perhaps?).
Secrets that dont change are known to be honey pots for hackers.
I just dont see why we want to risk security regressions for something
that proved to work well.
Cache invalidation is just a genid change nowadays, and dont have side
effects.
Considering we do cache invalidation when routes are changed anyway, I
dont get why we should avoid the invalidation once every xxx seconds...
If you believe this cache invalidation has problems, maybe we should
address them and not hide them ?
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