netdev - Re: setsockopt(IP_TOS) being privileged or distinct capability?

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Date:	Tue, 06 Jul 2010 10:17:26 +0200
From:	Rémi Denis-Courmont <remi@...lab.net>
To:	Philip Prindeville <philipp_subx@...fish-solutions.com>
Cc:	netdev@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: setsockopt(IP_TOS) being privileged or distinct capability?

On Sat, 03 Jul 2010 11:58:45 -0600, Philip Prindeville
<philipp_subx@...fish-solutions.com> wrote:
> Does anyone else think that setsockopt(IP_TOS) should be a privileged
> operation, perhaps using CAP_NET_ADMIN, or maybe even adding separate
> granularity as CAP_NET_TOS?

That's a terribly idea.
Some applications do rely on this to set their TOS "correctly". If you
don't want unprivileged applications to be able to affect the queuing
policy, then don't use the TOS bits in your queuing policy - as simple as
that.

-- 
Rémi Denis-Courmont
http://www.remlab.net
http://fi.linkedin.com/in/remidenis

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