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Message-Id: <1279807758-6876-2-git-send-email-luciano.coelho@nokia.com>
Date:	Thu, 22 Jul 2010 17:09:18 +0300
From:	Luciano Coelho <luciano.coelho@...ia.com>
To:	netfilter-devel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:	netdev@...r.kernel.org, kaber@...sh.net, jengelh@...ozas.de,
	sameo@...ux.intel.com
Subject: [RFC 1/1] netfilter: xtables: inclusion of xt_condition

xt_condition can be used by userspace to influence decisions in rules
by means of togglable variables without having to reload the entire
ruleset.

This is a respin of the module in Xtables-addons, with support for
multiple namespaces and other small improvements.

Cc: Jan Engelhardt <jengelh@...ozas.de>
Signed-off-by: Luciano Coelho <luciano.coelho@...ia.com>
---
 include/linux/netfilter/Kbuild         |    1 +
 include/linux/netfilter/xt_condition.h |   14 ++
 net/netfilter/Kconfig                  |    8 +
 net/netfilter/Makefile                 |    1 +
 net/netfilter/xt_condition.c           |  294 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 5 files changed, 318 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 include/linux/netfilter/xt_condition.h
 create mode 100644 net/netfilter/xt_condition.c

diff --git a/include/linux/netfilter/Kbuild b/include/linux/netfilter/Kbuild
index bb103f4..d873f67 100644
--- a/include/linux/netfilter/Kbuild
+++ b/include/linux/netfilter/Kbuild
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ header-y += xt_TCPOPTSTRIP.h
 header-y += xt_TEE.h
 header-y += xt_TPROXY.h
 header-y += xt_comment.h
+header-y += xt_condition.h
 header-y += xt_connbytes.h
 header-y += xt_connlimit.h
 header-y += xt_connmark.h
diff --git a/include/linux/netfilter/xt_condition.h b/include/linux/netfilter/xt_condition.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4faf3ca
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/linux/netfilter/xt_condition.h
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+#ifndef _XT_CONDITION_H
+#define _XT_CONDITION_H
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+struct xt_condition_mtinfo {
+	char name[31];
+	__u8 invert;
+
+	/* Used internally by the kernel */
+	void *condvar __attribute__((aligned(8)));
+};
+
+#endif /* _XT_CONDITION_H */
diff --git a/net/netfilter/Kconfig b/net/netfilter/Kconfig
index aa2f106..8c114b8 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/Kconfig
+++ b/net/netfilter/Kconfig
@@ -605,6 +605,14 @@ config NETFILTER_XT_MATCH_COMMENT
 	  If you want to compile it as a module, say M here and read
 	  <file:Documentation/kbuild/modules.txt>.  If unsure, say `N'.
 
+config NETFILTER_XT_MATCH_CONDITION
+	tristate '"condition" match support'
+	depends on NETFILTER_ADVANCED
+	depends on PROC_FS
+	---help---
+	This option allows you to match firewall rules against condition
+	variables stored in the /proc/net/nf_condition directory.
+
 config NETFILTER_XT_MATCH_CONNBYTES
 	tristate  '"connbytes" per-connection counter match support'
 	depends on NF_CONNTRACK
diff --git a/net/netfilter/Makefile b/net/netfilter/Makefile
index e28420a..474dd06 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/Makefile
+++ b/net/netfilter/Makefile
@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_TARGET_IDLETIMER) += xt_IDLETIMER.o
 # matches
 obj-$(CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_MATCH_CLUSTER) += xt_cluster.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_MATCH_COMMENT) += xt_comment.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_MATCH_CONDITION) += xt_condition.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_MATCH_CONNBYTES) += xt_connbytes.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_MATCH_CONNLIMIT) += xt_connlimit.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_MATCH_CONNTRACK) += xt_conntrack.o
diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_condition.c b/net/netfilter/xt_condition.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..162aa60
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/netfilter/xt_condition.c
@@ -0,0 +1,294 @@
+/*
+ *	"condition" match extension for Xtables
+ *
+ *	Description: This module allows firewall rules to match using
+ *	condition variables available through procfs.
+ *
+ *	Authors:
+ *	Stephane Ouellette <ouellettes@...eotron.ca>, 2002-10-22
+ *	Massimiliano Hofer <max@...leus.it>, 2006-05-15
+ *
+ *	This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ *	under the terms of the GNU General Public License; either version 2
+ *	or 3 of the License, as published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ */
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/list.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/version.h>
+#include <linux/nsproxy.h>
+#include <linux/netfilter/x_tables.h>
+#include <linux/netfilter/xt_condition.h>
+#include <net/netns/generic.h>
+#include <asm/uaccess.h>
+
+MODULE_AUTHOR("Stephane Ouellette <ouellettes@...eotron.ca>");
+MODULE_AUTHOR("Massimiliano Hofer <max@...leus.it>");
+MODULE_AUTHOR("Jan Engelhardt <jengelh@...ozas.de>");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Allows rules to match against condition variables");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(condition_list_perms, "default permissions on /proc/net/nf_condition/* files");
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(condition_uid_perms, "default user owner of /proc/net/nf_condition/* files");
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(condition_gid_perms, "default group owner of /proc/net/nf_condition/* files");
+MODULE_ALIAS("ipt_condition");
+MODULE_ALIAS("ip6t_condition");
+
+struct condition_variable {
+	struct list_head list;
+	struct proc_dir_entry *status_proc;
+	unsigned int refcount;
+	bool enabled;
+};
+
+struct condition_net {
+	struct list_head list;
+	struct proc_dir_entry *proc_dir;
+	unsigned int list_perms;
+	unsigned int uid_perms;
+	unsigned int gid_perms;
+};
+
+static int condition_net_id;
+static inline struct condition_net *condition_pernet(struct net *net)
+{
+	return net_generic(net, condition_net_id);
+}
+
+/* proc_lock is a user context only semaphore used for write access */
+/*           to the conditions' list.                               */
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(proc_lock);
+
+static int condition_proc_read(char __user *buffer, char **start, off_t offset,
+			       int length, int *eof, void *data)
+{
+	const struct condition_variable *var = data;
+
+	buffer[0] = var->enabled ? '1' : '0';
+	buffer[1] = '\n';
+	if (length >= 2)
+		*eof = true;
+	return 2;
+}
+
+static int condition_proc_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer,
+				unsigned long length, void *data)
+{
+	struct condition_variable *var = data;
+	char newval;
+
+	if (length > 0) {
+		if (get_user(newval, buffer) != 0)
+			return -EFAULT;
+		/* Match only on the first character */
+		switch (newval) {
+		case '0':
+			var->enabled = false;
+			break;
+		case '1':
+			var->enabled = true;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	return length;
+}
+
+static bool
+condition_mt(const struct sk_buff *skb, struct xt_action_param *par)
+{
+	const struct xt_condition_mtinfo *info = par->matchinfo;
+	const struct condition_variable *var   = info->condvar;
+
+	return var->enabled ^ info->invert;
+}
+
+static int condition_mt_check(const struct xt_mtchk_param *par)
+{
+	struct xt_condition_mtinfo *info = par->matchinfo;
+	struct condition_variable *var;
+	struct condition_net *cond_net =
+		condition_pernet(current->nsproxy->net_ns);
+
+	/* Forbid certain names */
+	if (*info->name == '\0' || *info->name == '.' ||
+	    info->name[sizeof(info->name)-1] != '\0' ||
+	    memchr(info->name, '/', sizeof(info->name)) != NULL) {
+		pr_info("name not allowed or too long: \"%.*s\"\n",
+			(unsigned int)sizeof(info->name), info->name);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Let's acquire the lock, check for the condition and add it
+	 * or increase the reference counter.
+	 */
+	mutex_lock(&proc_lock);
+	list_for_each_entry(var, &cond_net->list, list) {
+		if (strcmp(info->name, var->status_proc->name) == 0) {
+			++var->refcount;
+			mutex_unlock(&proc_lock);
+			info->condvar = var;
+			return 0;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* At this point, we need to allocate a new condition variable. */
+	var = kmalloc(sizeof(struct condition_variable), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (var == NULL) {
+		mutex_unlock(&proc_lock);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	/* Create the condition variable's proc file entry. */
+	var->status_proc = create_proc_entry(info->name,
+					     cond_net->list_perms,
+					     cond_net->proc_dir);
+	if (var->status_proc == NULL) {
+		kfree(var);
+		mutex_unlock(&proc_lock);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	var->refcount = 1;
+	var->enabled  = false;
+	var->status_proc->data       = var;
+	var->status_proc->read_proc  = condition_proc_read;
+	var->status_proc->write_proc = condition_proc_write;
+	var->status_proc->uid        = cond_net->uid_perms;
+	var->status_proc->gid        = cond_net->gid_perms;
+	list_add(&var->list, &cond_net->list);
+	mutex_unlock(&proc_lock);
+	info->condvar = var;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void condition_mt_destroy(const struct xt_mtdtor_param *par)
+{
+	const struct xt_condition_mtinfo *info = par->matchinfo;
+	struct condition_variable *var = info->condvar;
+	struct condition_net *cond_net =
+		condition_pernet(current->nsproxy->net_ns);
+
+	mutex_lock(&proc_lock);
+	if (--var->refcount == 0) {
+		list_del(&var->list);
+		remove_proc_entry(var->status_proc->name,
+				  cond_net->proc_dir);
+		mutex_unlock(&proc_lock);
+		kfree(var);
+		return;
+	}
+	mutex_unlock(&proc_lock);
+}
+
+static struct xt_match condition_mt_reg __read_mostly = {
+	.name       = "condition",
+	.revision   = 1,
+	.family     = NFPROTO_UNSPEC,
+	.matchsize  = sizeof(struct xt_condition_mtinfo),
+	.match      = condition_mt,
+	.checkentry = condition_mt_check,
+	.destroy    = condition_mt_destroy,
+	.me         = THIS_MODULE,
+};
+
+static const char *const dir_name = "nf_condition";
+
+static int __net_init condnet_mt_init(struct net *net)
+{
+	struct condition_net *cond_net = condition_pernet(net);
+
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&cond_net->list);
+	cond_net->list_perms = S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR;
+	cond_net->uid_perms  = S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR;
+	cond_net->gid_perms  = S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR;
+
+	cond_net->proc_dir = proc_mkdir(dir_name, net->proc_net);
+
+	return (cond_net->proc_dir == NULL) ? -EACCES : 0;
+}
+
+static void __net_exit condnet_mt_exit(struct net *net)
+{
+	remove_proc_entry(dir_name, net->proc_net);
+}
+
+static struct pernet_operations condition_mt_netops = {
+	.init = condnet_mt_init,
+	.exit = condnet_mt_exit,
+	.id   = &condition_net_id,
+	.size = sizeof(struct condition_net),
+};
+
+static int __init condition_mt_init(void)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	mutex_init(&proc_lock);
+	ret = xt_register_match(&condition_mt_reg);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+
+	ret = register_pernet_subsys(&condition_mt_netops);
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		xt_unregister_match(&condition_mt_reg);
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void __exit condition_mt_exit(void)
+{
+	unregister_pernet_subsys(&condition_mt_netops);
+	xt_unregister_match(&condition_mt_reg);
+}
+
+int xt_condition_set_module_perms(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp)
+{
+	unsigned long l;
+	int ret;
+	struct condition_net *cond_net =
+		condition_pernet(current->nsproxy->net_ns);
+
+	if (!val) return -EINVAL;
+	ret = strict_strtoul(val, 0, &l);
+	if (ret == -EINVAL || ((uint)l != l))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	*((u32 *) ((u8 *) cond_net + (size_t) kp->arg)) = l;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xt_condition_set_module_perms);
+
+int xt_condition_get_module_perms(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp)
+{
+	struct condition_net *cond_net =
+		condition_pernet(current->nsproxy->net_ns);
+
+	return sprintf(buffer, "%u",
+		       *((u32 *) ((u8 *) cond_net + (size_t) kp->arg)));
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xt_condition_get_module_perms);
+
+module_param_call(list_perms,
+		  xt_condition_set_module_perms,
+		  xt_condition_get_module_perms,
+		  (void *) offsetof(struct condition_net, list_perms),
+		  0600);
+module_param_call(uid_perms,
+		  xt_condition_set_module_perms,
+		  xt_condition_get_module_perms,
+		  (void *) offsetof(struct condition_net, uid_perms),
+		  0600);
+module_param_call(gid_perms,
+		  xt_condition_set_module_perms,
+		  xt_condition_get_module_perms,
+		  (void *) offsetof(struct condition_net, gid_perms),
+		  0600);
+
+module_init(condition_mt_init);
+module_exit(condition_mt_exit);
-- 
1.7.0.4

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