[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <alpine.LNX.2.01.1008231628010.21000@obet.zrqbmnf.qr>
Date: Mon, 23 Aug 2010 16:34:26 +0200 (CEST)
From: Jan Engelhardt <jengelh@...ozas.de>
To: Luciano Coelho <luciano.coelho@...ia.com>
cc: ext Changli Gao <xiaosuo@...il.com>,
"kaber@...sh.net" <kaber@...sh.net>,
"netfilter-devel@...r.kernel.org" <netfilter-devel@...r.kernel.org>,
"netdev@...r.kernel.org" <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
"linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org"
<linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] netfilter: xt_condition: add security capability
support
On Monday 2010-08-23 15:42, Luciano Coelho wrote:
>> > /* Defaults, these can be overridden on the module command-line. */
>> > static unsigned int condition_list_perms = S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR;
>> > static unsigned int condition_uid_perms = 0;
>> > static unsigned int condition_gid_perms = 0;
>> > +static unsigned int condition_capabilities = CAP_NET_ADMIN;
>> >
>> It is strange that we set security policy in this way. Maybe the
>> permission of the proc file is enough in this case.
>
>Yes, that is another way to do it. But in our device we use security
>capabilities more extensively than normal file permissions. That's why
>we need this.
>
>If this is too restrictive (ie. having CAP_NET_ADMIN) for most users, we
>could change the default value to no capabilities needed. Then we can
>set CAP_NET_ADMIN when loading the module.
But it looks as strange as the Yama code attempt. This is the one time
where I would personally be looking into SELinux, or perhaps SMACK if
the former is too complex, to whether _t'ing off procfs is possible.
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe netdev" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Powered by blists - more mailing lists