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Message-ID: <alpine.LNX.2.01.1008232052170.31619@obet.zrqbmnf.qr>
Date: Mon, 23 Aug 2010 20:58:05 +0200 (CEST)
From: Jan Engelhardt <jengelh@...ozas.de>
To: Luciano Coelho <luciano.coelho@...ia.com>
cc: ext Changli Gao <xiaosuo@...il.com>,
"kaber@...sh.net" <kaber@...sh.net>,
"netfilter-devel@...r.kernel.org" <netfilter-devel@...r.kernel.org>,
"netdev@...r.kernel.org" <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
"linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org"
<linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] netfilter: xt_condition: add security capability
support
On Monday 2010-08-23 20:45, Luciano Coelho wrote:
>> But it looks as strange as the Yama code attempt.
>
>What is so strange about it? Is it because it's possible to set the
>capability requirement from modprobe arguments? The capability check
>already exists in at least in nfnetlink, where it checks for received
>messages for the CAP_NET_ADMIN capability. Is it strange because we're
>checking for the capability when someone tries to write to a file?
It is strange that you check this capability from a module focused on
packet handling. For lack of a better example, it's as if you tried
to check the uid of the file, the latter of which is better left to
the routines in fs/.
>> This is the one time
>> where I would personally be looking into SELinux, or perhaps SMACK if
>> the former is too complex, to whether _t'ing off procfs is possible.
>
>Yeah, but it's not up to me to decide this. We have one entire team
>dedicated to figuring out how to ensure "security" in our device. It
>was that team who advised us to protect this file by checking for
>CAP_NET_ADMIN.
You can do whatever you want with your product. I am just saying this
does not look like kernel material, and I suppose it won't go well
with the maintainers up the chain either.
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