netdev - Re: [PATCH] netfilter: xt_condition: add security capability support

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Message-ID: <1282720198.18016.72.camel@powerslave>
Date:	Wed, 25 Aug 2010 10:09:58 +0300
From:	Luciano Coelho <luciano.coelho@...ia.com>
To:	ext Jan Engelhardt <jengelh@...ozas.de>
Cc:	ext Changli Gao <xiaosuo@...il.com>,
	"kaber@...sh.net" <kaber@...sh.net>,
	"netfilter-devel@...r.kernel.org" <netfilter-devel@...r.kernel.org>,
	"netdev@...r.kernel.org" <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
	James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
	"linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org" 
	<linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] netfilter: xt_condition: add security capability
 support

Hi Jan,

Thanks for your reply.


On Tue, 2010-08-24 at 09:32 +0200, ext Jan Engelhardt wrote:
> On Tuesday 2010-08-24 09:00, Luciano Coelho wrote:
> >>
> >>It is strange that you check this capability from a module focused
> >>on packet handling. For lack of a better example, it's as if you
> >>tried to check the uid of the file, the latter of which is better
> >>left to the routines in fs/.
> >
> >What I don't understand is that I see lots of components, which have
> >nothing to do with security, making this kind of checks. Most of
> >them (if not all) are checking for input from userspace where they
> >provide their own interfaces (eg. ioctl calls, netlink messages).
> >[..] Now, with the xt_condition, we're opening a new route from
> >userspace to the kernel and I think it might be a good idea to
> >protect that too.
> 
> Indeed so. But you did not invent any new interface. You are reusing
> files, which can be protected by DAC modes, or LSMs doing
> funky-stuff. xt_{condition,recent,..} already implement file modes,
> but does it check for it? Well no, because fs/namei.c does it for
> them. As for LSMs, well, I hope they do cater for testing for
> capability bits.

Thanks, I'll investigate all this a bit more and contact our security
people again.

I dug deeper into the code and I can see that /sys/net has capability
checks (implemented in netdev_store() in net-sysfs.c) and nobody without
CAP_NET_ADMIN will be able to write to the files there.  But in procfs I
couldn't see anything similar and anyone with file write permissions can
modify the files in /proc/net/*.


> >It's kind of useless to protect someone without CAP_NET_ADMIN from
> >creating a condition rule if it is possible to change the condition from
> >userspace without any capability protection.
> 
> Certainly not. An administrator may create a condition rule and thus
> procfs entry, but the rule may be sufficiently safe and/or integrated
> that a subordinate may be given permission to control things in a
> limited fashion on a per-need basis. One I use personally is
> 
> 	-A FORWARD -m condition --condition windows -s
> 	192.168.100.0/25 -i eth1 -o eth0 -j ACCEPT
> 	-P FORWARD DROP
> 
> 	chown jengelh /proc/net/nf_condition/windows;
> 
> The presence of such rule would indicate that the administrator
> generally allows Windows machines out; but personal paranoia defaults
> to rejecting that unless explicitly enabled. (Gives the reassurance
> that they won't succeed talking home unless Internet connectivity is
> explicitly needed by the user.)

I see, this is a good example. :) I know that his works (with simple DAC
control), but I think we're looking into a bit more security than that.
I have to discuss this with our platform security people.

Again, thanks for your explanations.


-- 
Cheers,
Luca.

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