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Message-ID: <AANLkTinXmKrf+wovco0j_aBuB7=qSq42+bVCM-amfL7W@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 24 Oct 2010 20:42:39 -0700
From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
To: David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>
Cc: drosenberg@...curity.com, jon.maloy@...csson.com,
allan.stephens@...driver.com, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
security@...nel.org
Subject: Re: [Security] TIPC security issues
On Sun, Oct 24, 2010 at 7:14 PM, David Miller <davem@...emloft.net> wrote:
>
> Maybe the filesystem paths are this way, but the bulk of the socket
> paths properly use size_t when touching anything even related
> to an I/O length.
Umm. "Bulk" is not "all".
Which is the whole point. Most filesystems have no trouble either. But
when a mistake is a security issue, that's not enough.
> I know that TCP can do a >= 4GB write just fine right now.
Again - totally irrelevant. Plus anybody who relies on doing 4GB
writes in one go would be broken _anyway_.
In other words, what you argue for has zero upsides, and it has
downsides. As shown by the fact that TIPC was buggy.
> In fact if you look I recently removed the last obstacle to this based
> upon a bug report from a user trying to do a 4GB write (which ended up
> getting truncated to zero):
.. and if you looked at my suggested patch, you would have seen that
it would have avoided that, and still worked fine (exactly because it
doesn't truncate anything).
David - the issue is _security_. The way to fix security problems is
not to say "most things handle this correctly". The way to avoid them
is to have several layers of handling things correctly, so that even
when one turns out to be broken, the others still protect it.
Linus
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