netdev - [SECURITY] CAN info leak/minor heap overflow

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Message-ID: <1288722503.2504.14.camel@dan>
Date:	Tue, 02 Nov 2010 14:28:23 -0400
From:	Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@...curity.com>
To:	socketcan@...tkopp.net, oliver.hartkopp@...kswagen.de,
	urs.thuermann@...kswagen.de
Cc:	netdev@...r.kernel.org, security@...nel.org
Subject: [SECURITY] CAN info leak/minor heap overflow

In bcm_connect() (in net/can/bcm.c), I noticed the following code:

	sprintf(bo->procname, "%p", sock);

"procname" is a 9-byte char array.  This code is wrong on two levels.
First, leaking a kernel address via a /proc filename is bad.  Secondly,
on 64-bit platforms, up to 17 bytes may be copied into the buffer.
Fortunately, structure padding will most likely prevent this from being
a problem, except for the trailing NULL byte, which may overwrite the
first byte of the next heap object.  Please name your procfile in a way
that doesn't leak information and fits into the desired name buffer.

-Dan

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