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Message-ID: <87sjzcssx5.fsf@basil.nowhere.org>
Date: Sun, 07 Nov 2010 22:52:22 +0100
From: Andi Kleen <andi@...stfloor.org>
To: Ted Ts'o <tytso@....edu>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@...curity.com>,
"chas\@cmf.nrl.navy.mil" <chas@....nrl.navy.mil>,
"davem\@davemloft.net" <davem@...emloft.net>,
"kuznet\@ms2.inr.ac.ru" <kuznet@....inr.ac.ru>,
"pekkas\@netcore.fi" <pekkas@...core.fi>,
"jmorris\@namei.org" <jmorris@...ei.org>,
"yoshfuji\@linux-ipv6.org" <yoshfuji@...ux-ipv6.org>,
"kaber\@trash.net" <kaber@...sh.net>,
"remi.denis-courmont\@nokia.com" <remi.denis-courmont@...ia.com>,
"netdev\@vger.kernel.org" <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
"security\@kernel.org" <security@...nel.org>
Subject: Re: [Security] [SECURITY] Fix leaking of kernel heap addresses via /proc
Ted Ts'o <tytso@....edu> writes:
> Are there any userspace programs that might be reasonably expected to
> _use_ this information? If there is, we could just pick a random
> number at boot time, and then XOR the heap adddress with that random
> number.
If any of the addresses can be guessed ever (and that is likely if it's
allocated at boot) determining the random value will be trivial
for everyone.
-Andi
--
ak@...ux.intel.com -- Speaking for myself only.
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