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Message-ID: <20101203073403.GA2292@gondor.apana.org.au>
Date: Fri, 3 Dec 2010 15:34:03 +0800
From: Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>
To: Martin Willi <martin@...ongswan.org>
Cc: linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org, netdev@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/5] xfrm: Traffic Flow Confidentiality for IPv4 ESP
On Tue, Nov 30, 2010 at 03:49:13PM +0000, Martin Willi wrote:
>
> + if (skb->len >= tfcpadto) {
> + clen = ALIGN(skb->len + 2, blksize);
> + } else if (x->tfc.flags & XFRM_TFC_ESPV3 &&
> + x->props.mode == XFRM_MODE_TUNNEL) {
> + /* ESPv3 TFC padding, append bytes to payload */
> + tfclen = tfcpadto - skb->len;
> + clen = ALIGN(skb->len + 2 + tfclen, blksize);
> + } else {
> + /* ESPv2 TFC padding. If we exceed the 255 byte maximum, use
> + * random padding to hide payload length as good as possible. */
> + clen = ALIGN(skb->len + 2 + tfcpadto - skb->len, blksize);
> + if (clen - skb->len - 2 > 255) {
> + clen = ALIGN(skb->len + (u8)random32() + 2, blksize);
> + if (clen - skb->len - 2 > 255)
> + clen -= blksize;
> + }
What is the basis of this random length padding?
Also, what happens when padto exceeds the MTU? Doesn't this
effectively disable PMTU-discovery?
I know that your last patch allows the padto to be set by PMTU.
But why would we ever want to use a padto that isn't clamped by
PMTU?
Cheers,
--
Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt
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