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Message-ID: <20101222162025.GB20358@elte.hu>
Date: Wed, 22 Dec 2010 17:20:25 +0100
From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>
To: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@...curity.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, jmorris@...ei.org,
eric.dumazet@...il.com, tgraf@...radead.org, eugeneteo@...nel.org,
kees.cook@...onical.com, davem@...emloft.net,
a.p.zijlstra@...llo.nl, akpm@...ux-foundation.org,
eparis@...isplace.org,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4] kptr_restrict for hiding kernel pointers
* Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@...curity.com> wrote:
>
> > Hm, why is it off by default? Is there some user-space regression that is caused
> > by this?
> >
> > We really want good security measures to be active by default (and to work by
> > default) - they are not worth much if they are not.
>
> I agree entirely, but I've received a lot of resistance to these types
> of changes in net. I'm afraid that if it's enabled by default, no one
> will actually allow use of the %pK specifier where it should be used.
Some specific objections would be needed - which might arrive if the default is
changed to on.
> As far as I know, there's no actual breakage of anything in userspace,
> but there's a general "it might make it harder to debug things in
> certain limited circumstances" sentiment among some. I never understood
> why it is necessary for unprivileged users to be able to debug the
> kernel.
>
> Does anyone else have thoughts on this?
Well, lets just enable it by default and let others argue for less security, hm?
Thanks,
Ingo
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