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Message-Id: <20101222123444.4869b3ed.akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Date: Wed, 22 Dec 2010 12:34:44 -0800
From: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
To: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@...il.com>,
Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@...curity.com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, jmorris@...ei.org,
tgraf@...radead.org, eugeneteo@...nel.org, kees.cook@...onical.com,
davem@...emloft.net, a.p.zijlstra@...llo.nl, eparis@...isplace.org,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4] kptr_restrict for hiding kernel pointers
On Wed, 22 Dec 2010 17:21:18 +0100
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu> wrote:
>
> * Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@...il.com> wrote:
>
> > Le mercredi 22 d__cembre 2010 __ 08:13 -0500, Dan Rosenberg a __crit :
> > > > Hm, why is it off by default? Is there some user-space regression that is caused by
> > > > this?
> > > >
> > > > We really want good security measures to be active by default (and to work by
> > > > default) - they are not worth much if they are not.
> > > >
> > >
> > > I agree entirely, but I've received a lot of resistance to these types
> > > of changes in net. I'm afraid that if it's enabled by default, no one
> > > will actually allow use of the %pK specifier where it should be used.
> > >
> >
> > Actually, "net resistance" was against your first patches, using quick
> > and dirty techniques (Should I remind you some of them ?)
> >
> > Now you have a helper, it should be easier to integrate the changes.
>
> Great - if the concept itself wasnt objected to then i think we should flip the
> default to on.
>
Yes, I'll make that change. If we get reports of breakage during
2.6.38-rcX then we can reconsider. But if we leave the feature
disabled, we will never know...
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