[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <20110225174751.GA722@albatros>
Date: Fri, 25 Feb 2011 20:47:51 +0300
From: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@...nwall.com>
To: Valdis.Kletnieks@...edu
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Alexey Kuznetsov <kuznet@....inr.ac.ru>,
"Pekka Savola (ipv6)" <pekkas@...core.fi>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
Hideaki YOSHIFUJI <yoshfuji@...ux-ipv6.org>,
Patrick McHardy <kaber@...sh.net>,
Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@...il.com>,
Tom Herbert <therbert@...gle.com>,
Changli Gao <xiaosuo@...il.com>, Jesse Gross <jesse@...ira.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] don't allow CAP_NET_ADMIN to load non-netdev kernel
modules
On Fri, Feb 25, 2011 at 12:25 -0500, Valdis.Kletnieks@...edu wrote:
> And you stop an attacker from simply recompiling the module with a suitable
> MODULE_ALIAS line added, how, exactly? This patch may make sense down the
> road, but not while it's still trivial for a malicious root user to drop stuff
> into /lib/modules.
The threat is not a malicious root, but non-root with CAP_NET_ADMIN.
It's hardly possible to load arbitrary module into the kernel having
CAP_NET_ADMIN without other capabilities.
> And if you're going the route "but SELinux/SMACK/Tomoyo will prevent a malicious
> root user from doing that", then the obvious reply is "this should be part of those
> subsystems rather than something done one-off like this (especially as it has a chance
> of breaking legitimate setups that use the current scheme).
No, I don't want to add anything about LSMs at all.
Thanks,
--
Vasiliy Kulikov
http://www.openwall.com - bringing security into open computing environments
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe netdev" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Powered by blists - more mailing lists