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Message-ID: <20111019022552.GA29251@sergelap>
Date: Tue, 18 Oct 2011 21:25:52 -0500
From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@...onical.com>
To: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>
Cc: Joe Perches <joe@...ches.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
ebiederm@...ssion.com, akpm@...ux-foundation.org, oleg@...hat.com,
richard@....at, mikevs@...all.net, segoon@...nwall.com,
gregkh@...e.de, dhowells@...hat.com, eparis@...hat.com,
netdev@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 9/9] make net/core/scm.c uid comparisons user namespace aware
(v2)
(Thanks for the suggestions, Joe.)
Currently uids are compared without regard for the user namespace.
Fix that to prevent tasks in a different user namespace from
wrongly matching on SCM_CREDENTIALS.
In the past, either your uids had to match, or you had to have
CAP_SETXID. In a namespaced world, you must either (both be in the
same user namespace and have your uids match), or you must have
CAP_SETXID targeted at the other user namespace. The latter can
happen for instance if uid 500 created a new user namespace and
now interacts with uid 0 in it.
Changelog: Oct 18:
Per Joe Perches: don't mark uidequiv and gidequiv fns inline
(let the compiler do that if appropriate), and change the flow
of id comparisons to make it clearer.
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@...onical.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
Cc: Joe Perches <joe@...ches.com>
---
net/core/scm.c | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
1 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/core/scm.c b/net/core/scm.c
index 811b53f..2261607 100644
--- a/net/core/scm.c
+++ b/net/core/scm.c
@@ -43,17 +43,46 @@
* setu(g)id.
*/
-static __inline__ int scm_check_creds(struct ucred *creds)
+static bool uidequiv(const struct cred *src, struct ucred *tgt,
+ struct user_namespace *ns)
+{
+ if (src->user_ns != ns)
+ goto check_capable;
+ if (tgt->uid == src->uid ||
+ tgt->uid == src->euid ||
+ tgt->uid == src->suid)
+ return true;
+check_capable:
+ if (ns_capable(ns, CAP_SETUID))
+ return true;
+ return false;
+}
+
+static bool gidequiv(const struct cred *src, struct ucred *tgt,
+ struct user_namespace *ns)
+{
+ if (src->user_ns != ns)
+ goto check_capable;
+ if (tgt->gid == src->gid ||
+ tgt->gid == src->egid ||
+ tgt->gid == src->sgid)
+ return true;
+check_capable:
+ if (ns_capable(ns, CAP_SETGID))
+ return true;
+ return false;
+}
+
+static int scm_check_creds(struct ucred *creds, struct socket *sock)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+ struct user_namespace *ns = sock_net(sock->sk)->user_ns;
- if ((creds->pid == task_tgid_vnr(current) || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) &&
- ((creds->uid == cred->uid || creds->uid == cred->euid ||
- creds->uid == cred->suid) || capable(CAP_SETUID)) &&
- ((creds->gid == cred->gid || creds->gid == cred->egid ||
- creds->gid == cred->sgid) || capable(CAP_SETGID))) {
+ if ((creds->pid == task_tgid_vnr(current) || ns_capable(ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) &&
+ uidequiv(cred, creds, ns) && gidequiv(cred, creds, ns)) {
return 0;
}
+
return -EPERM;
}
@@ -169,7 +198,7 @@ int __scm_send(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *p)
if (cmsg->cmsg_len != CMSG_LEN(sizeof(struct ucred)))
goto error;
memcpy(&p->creds, CMSG_DATA(cmsg), sizeof(struct ucred));
- err = scm_check_creds(&p->creds);
+ err = scm_check_creds(&p->creds, sock);
if (err)
goto error;
--
1.7.5.4
--
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