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Message-Id: <125BB325-72D4-4FEF-A5CC-118680EC78D2@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2011 14:26:30 -0500
From: Xi Wang <xi.wang@...il.com>
To: Vladislav Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@...com>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Sridhar Samudrala <sri@...ibm.com>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
linux-sctp@...r.kernel.org, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
security@...nel.org
Subject: [PATCH v2] sctp: better integer overflow check in sctp_auth_create_key()
The check from commit 30c2235c is incomplete and cannot prevent
cases like key_len = 0x80000000 (INT_MAX + 1). In that case, the
left-hand side of the check (INT_MAX - key_len), which is unsigned,
becomes 0xffffffff (UINT_MAX) and bypasses the check.
However this shouldn't be a security issue. The function is called
from the following two code paths:
1) setsockopt()
2) sctp_auth_asoc_set_secret()
In case (1), sca_keylength is never going to exceed 65535 since it's
bounded by a u16 from the user API. As such, the key length will
never overflow.
In case (2), sca_keylength is computed based on the user key (1 short)
and 2 * key_vector (3 shorts) for a total of 7 * USHRT_MAX, which still
will not overflow.
In other words, this overflow check is not really necessary. Just
make it more correct.
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@...il.com>
Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@...com>
---
net/sctp/auth.c | 2 +-
1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/sctp/auth.c b/net/sctp/auth.c
index 865e68f..bf81204 100644
--- a/net/sctp/auth.c
+++ b/net/sctp/auth.c
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ static struct sctp_auth_bytes *sctp_auth_create_key(__u32 key_len, gfp_t gfp)
struct sctp_auth_bytes *key;
/* Verify that we are not going to overflow INT_MAX */
- if ((INT_MAX - key_len) < sizeof(struct sctp_auth_bytes))
+ if (key_len > (INT_MAX - sizeof(struct sctp_auth_bytes)))
return NULL;
/* Allocate the shared key */
--
1.7.5.4
--
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