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Message-Id: <1324493459-19764-1-git-send-email-xi.wang@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 21 Dec 2011 13:50:59 -0500
From: Xi Wang <xi.wang@...il.com>
To: Tom Herbert <therbert@...gle.com>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>
Cc: netdev@...r.kernel.org, Xi Wang <xi.wang@...il.com>
Subject: [PATCH] rps: fix insufficient bounds checking in store_rps_dev_flow_table_cnt()
Setting a large rps_flow_cnt like 1073741824 (1 << 30) on 32-bit
platform will cause a kernel oops due to insufficient bounds checking.
if (count > 1<<30) {
/* Enforce a limit to prevent overflow */
return -EINVAL;
}
count = roundup_pow_of_two(count);
table = vmalloc(RPS_DEV_FLOW_TABLE_SIZE(count));
Note that the macro RPS_DEV_FLOW_TABLE_SIZE(count) is defined as:
... + (count * sizeof(struct rps_dev_flow))
where sizeof(struct rps_dev_flow) is 8. (1 << 30) * 8 will overflow
32 bits. This patch changes the upper bound to (1 << 28).
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@...il.com>
---
net/core/net-sysfs.c | 2 +-
1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/core/net-sysfs.c b/net/core/net-sysfs.c
index c71c434..f53a947 100644
--- a/net/core/net-sysfs.c
+++ b/net/core/net-sysfs.c
@@ -665,7 +665,7 @@ static ssize_t store_rps_dev_flow_table_cnt(struct netdev_rx_queue *queue,
if (count) {
int i;
- if (count > 1<<30) {
+ if (count > 1<<28) {
/* Enforce a limit to prevent overflow */
return -EINVAL;
}
--
1.7.5.4
--
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