Message-Id: <1333051320-30872-11-git-send-email-wad@chromium.org>
Date:	Thu, 29 Mar 2012 15:01:55 -0500
From:	Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>
To:	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-arch@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com,
	netdev@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org, arnd@...db.de,
	davem@...emloft.net, hpa@...or.com, mingo@...hat.com,
	oleg@...hat.com, peterz@...radead.org, rdunlap@...otime.net,
	mcgrathr@...omium.org, tglx@...utronix.de, luto@....edu,
	eparis@...hat.com, serge.hallyn@...onical.com, djm@...drot.org,
	scarybeasts@...il.com, indan@....nu, pmoore@...hat.com,
	akpm@...ux-foundation.org, corbet@....net, eric.dumazet@...il.com,
	markus@...omium.org, coreyb@...ux.vnet.ibm.com,
	keescook@...omium.org, jmorris@...ei.org,
	Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>
Subject: [PATCH v17 10/15] seccomp: add SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO

This change adds the SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO as a valid return value from a
seccomp filter.  Additionally, it makes the first use of the lower
16-bits for storing a filter-supplied errno.  16-bits is more than
enough for the errno-base.h calls.

Returning errors instead of immediately terminating processes that
violate seccomp policy allow for broader use of this functionality
for kernel attack surface reduction.  For example, a linux container
could maintain a whitelist of pre-existing system calls but drop
all new ones with errnos.  This would keep a logically static attack
surface while providing errnos that may allow for graceful failure
without the downside of do_exit() on a bad call.

v17: rebase
v16: -
v15: - use audit_seccomp and add a skip label. (eparis@...hat.com)
     - clean up and pad out return codes (indan@....nu)
v14: - no change/rebase
v13: - rebase on to 88ebdda6159ffc15699f204c33feb3e431bf9bdc
v12: - move to WARN_ON if filter is NULL
       (oleg@...hat.com, luto@....edu, keescook@...omium.org)
     - return immediately for filter==NULL (keescook@...omium.org)
     - change evaluation to only compare the ACTION so that layered
       errnos don't result in the lowest one being returned.
       (keeschook@...omium.org)
v11: - check for NULL filter (keescook@...omium.org)
v10: - change loaders to fn
 v9: - n/a
 v8: - update Kconfig to note new need for syscall_set_return_value.
     - reordered such that TRAP behavior follows on later.
     - made the for loop a little less indent-y
 v7: - introduced

Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@...onical.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>
---
 arch/Kconfig            |    6 ++++--
 include/linux/seccomp.h |   15 +++++++++++----
 kernel/seccomp.c        |   47 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
 3 files changed, 53 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig
index 697304d..9ba3003 100644
--- a/arch/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/Kconfig
@@ -217,8 +217,10 @@ config HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
 	bool
 	help
 	  This symbol should be selected by an architecure if it provides
-	  asm/syscall.h, specifically syscall_get_arguments() and
-	  syscall_get_arch().
+	  asm/syscall.h, specifically syscall_get_arguments(),
+	  syscall_get_arch(), and syscall_set_return_value().  Additionally,
+	  its system call entry path must respect a return value of -1 from
+	  __secure_computing_int() and/or secure_computing().
 
 config SECCOMP_FILTER
 	def_bool y
diff --git a/include/linux/seccomp.h b/include/linux/seccomp.h
index 86bb68f..44004df 100644
--- a/include/linux/seccomp.h
+++ b/include/linux/seccomp.h
@@ -12,13 +12,14 @@
 
 /*
  * All BPF programs must return a 32-bit value.
- * The bottom 16-bits are reserved for future use.
+ * The bottom 16-bits are for optional return data.
  * The upper 16-bits are ordered from least permissive values to most.
  *
  * The ordering ensures that a min_t() over composed return values always
  * selects the least permissive choice.
  */
 #define SECCOMP_RET_KILL	0x00000000U /* kill the task immediately */
+#define SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO	0x00050000U /* returns an errno */
 #define SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW	0x7fff0000U /* allow */
 
 /* Masks for the return value sections. */
@@ -64,11 +65,17 @@ struct seccomp {
 	struct seccomp_filter *filter;
 };
 
-extern void __secure_computing(int);
-static inline void secure_computing(int this_syscall)
+/*
+ * Direct callers to __secure_computing should be updated as
+ * CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER propagates.
+ */
+extern void __secure_computing(int) __deprecated;
+extern int __secure_computing_int(int);
+static inline int secure_computing(int this_syscall)
 {
 	if (unlikely(test_thread_flag(TIF_SECCOMP)))
-		__secure_computing(this_syscall);
+		return  __secure_computing_int(this_syscall);
+	return 0;
 }
 
 extern long prctl_get_seccomp(void);
diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
index 85cbe37..06b97aa 100644
--- a/kernel/seccomp.c
+++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
@@ -195,15 +195,20 @@ static int seccomp_chk_filter(struct sock_filter *filter, unsigned int flen)
 static u32 seccomp_run_filters(int syscall)
 {
 	struct seccomp_filter *f;
-	u32 ret = SECCOMP_RET_KILL;
+	u32 ret = SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW;
+
+	/* Ensure unexpected behavior doesn't result in failing open. */
+	if (WARN_ON(current->seccomp.filter == NULL))
+		return SECCOMP_RET_KILL;
+
 	/*
 	 * All filters are evaluated in order of youngest to oldest. The lowest
-	 * BPF return value always takes priority.
+	 * BPF return value (ignoring the DATA) always takes priority.
 	 */
 	for (f = current->seccomp.filter; f; f = f->prev) {
-		ret = sk_run_filter(NULL, f->insns);
-		if (ret != SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW)
-			break;
+		u32 cur_ret = sk_run_filter(NULL, f->insns);
+		if ((cur_ret & SECCOMP_RET_ACTION) < (ret & SECCOMP_RET_ACTION))
+			ret = cur_ret;
 	}
 	return ret;
 }
@@ -343,9 +348,18 @@ static int mode1_syscalls_32[] = {
 
 void __secure_computing(int this_syscall)
 {
+	/* Filter calls should never use this function. */
+	BUG_ON(current->seccomp.mode == SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER);
+	__secure_computing_int(this_syscall);
+}
+
+int __secure_computing_int(int this_syscall)
+{
 	int mode = current->seccomp.mode;
 	int exit_sig = 0;
 	int *syscall;
+	u32 ret = SECCOMP_RET_KILL;
+	int data;
 
 	switch (mode) {
 	case SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT:
@@ -356,14 +370,26 @@ void __secure_computing(int this_syscall)
 #endif
 		do {
 			if (*syscall == this_syscall)
-				return;
+				return 0;
 		} while (*++syscall);
 		exit_sig = SIGKILL;
 		break;
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
 	case SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER:
-		if (seccomp_run_filters(this_syscall) == SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW)
-			return;
+		ret = seccomp_run_filters(this_syscall);
+		data = ret & SECCOMP_RET_DATA;
+		switch (code & SECCOMP_RET_ACTION) {
+		case SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO:
+			/* Set the low-order 16-bits as a errno. */
+			syscall_set_return_value(current, task_pt_regs(current),
+						 -data, 0);
+			goto skip;
+		case SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW:
+			return 0;
+		case SECCOMP_RET_KILL:
+		default:
+			break;
+		}
 		exit_sig = SIGSYS;
 		break;
 #endif
@@ -374,8 +400,11 @@ void __secure_computing(int this_syscall)
 #ifdef SECCOMP_DEBUG
 	dump_stack();
 #endif
-	audit_seccomp(this_syscall, exit_code, SECCOMP_RET_KILL);
+	audit_seccomp(this_syscall, exit_sig, ret);
 	do_exit(exit_sig);
+skip:
+	audit_seccomp(this_syscall, exit_sig, ret);
+	return -1;
 }
 
 long prctl_get_seccomp(void)
-- 
1.7.5.4

--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe netdev" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html

Powered by blists - more mailing lists