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Message-ID: <20120528115102.12068.79994.stgit@localhost.localdomain>
Date: Mon, 28 May 2012 13:52:16 +0200
From: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@...hat.com>
To: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@...hat.com>, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
Christoph Paasch <christoph.paasch@...ouvain.be>,
Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@...il.com>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Martin Topholm <mph@...h.dk>
Cc: Florian Westphal <fw@...len.de>, opurdila@...acom.com,
Hans Schillstrom <hans.schillstrom@...csson.com>
Subject: [RFC PATCH 0/2] Faster/parallel SYN handling to mitigate SYN floods
The following series is a RFC (Request For Comments) for implementing
a faster and parallel handling of TCP SYN connections, to mitigate SYN
flood attacks. This is against DaveM's net (f0d1b3c2bc), as net-next
is closed, as DaveM has mentioned numerous times ;-)
Only IPv4 TCP is handled here. The IPv6 TCP code also need to be
updated, but I'll deal with that part after we have agreed on a
solution for IPv4 TCP.
Patch 1/2: Is a cleanup, where I split out the SYN cookie handling
from tcp_v4_conn_request() into tcp_v4_syn_conn_limit().
Patch 2/2: Move tcp_v4_syn_conn_limit() outside bh_lock_sock() in
tcp_v4_rcv(). I would like some input on, (1) if this safe without
the lock, (2) if we need to do some sock lookup, before calling
tcp_v4_syn_conn_limit() (Christoph Paasch
<christoph.paasch@...ouvain.be> mentioned something about SYN
retransmissions)
---
Jesper Dangaard Brouer (2):
tcp: Early SYN limit and SYN cookie handling to mitigate SYN floods
tcp: extract syncookie part of tcp_v4_conn_request()
net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c | 131 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
1 files changed, 107 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
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