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Message-ID: <CAPshTChwnEaMTOsofFDP0ZY8U3VCP2ZrtXjdhKG03rRsx7kryA@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 4 Jun 2012 16:50:34 -0700
From: Jerry Chu <hkchu@...gle.com>
To: Damian Lukowski <damian@....rwth-aachen.de>
Cc: Netdev <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>,
Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@...sinki.fi>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/3] Revert Backoff [v3]: Calculate TCP's connection close
threshold as a time value.
Hi Damian,
On Mon, Jun 4, 2012 at 10:50 AM, Damian Lukowski
<damian@....rwth-aachen.de> wrote:
> Hi Jerry,
>
> please verify, I understood you correctly.
>
> You have set TCP_RTO_MIN to a lower value, e.g. 0.002 seconds to improve
> your internal low-latency traffic. Because of the improvement, R1
> timeouts are triggered too fast for external high-RTT traffic. Is that
> correct?
Correct.
> If so, may I suggest to set tcp_retries1 to a higher value? For
> TCP_RTO_MIN == 0.002 and tcp_retries1 == 10, R1 will be calculated to
> approximately 4 seconds.
I think hacking tcp_retries1 is the wrong solution. E.g., 10 retries may be too
generous for those short RTT flows.
I think the fundamental problem is - the ideal fix for your original RTO revert
problem should've used the per-flow RTO to compute R1 & R2. But that
computation may be too expensive so you used TCP_RTO_MIN as an
approximation - not a good idea IMHO!
The easiest solution I can see so far is to replace the check
if (!inet_csk(sk)->icsk_retransmits)
return false;
at the beginning of retransmits_timed_out() with
if (inet_csk(sk)->icsk_retransmits < boundary)
return false;
Best,
Jerry
>
> Is that ok?
>
> Best regards
> Damian
>
> Am Freitag, den 01.06.2012, 15:58 -0700 schrieb Jerry Chu:
>> > From: Damian Lukowski <damian@....rwth-aachen.de>
>> > Date: Wed, Aug 26, 2009 at 3:16 AM
>> > Subject: [PATCH 3/3] Revert Backoff [v3]: Calculate TCP's connection close
>> > threshold as a time value.
>> > To: Netdev <netdev@...r.kernel.org>
>> >
>> >
>> > RFC 1122 specifies two threshold values R1 and R2 for connection timeouts,
>> > which may represent a number of allowed retransmissions or a timeout value.
>> > Currently linux uses sysctl_tcp_retries{1,2} to specify the thresholds
>> > in number of allowed retransmissions.
>> >
>> > For any desired threshold R2 (by means of time) one can specify tcp_retries2
>> > (by means of number of retransmissions) such that TCP will not time out
>> > earlier than R2. This is the case, because the RTO schedule follows a fixed
>> > pattern, namely exponential backoff.
>> >
>> > However, the RTO behaviour is not predictable any more if RTO backoffs can
>> > be
>> > reverted, as it is the case in the draft
>> > "Make TCP more Robust to Long Connectivity Disruptions"
>> > (http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-zimmermann-tcp-lcd).
>> >
>> > In the worst case TCP would time out a connection after 3.2 seconds, if the
>> > initial RTO equaled MIN_RTO and each backoff has been reverted.
>> >
>> > This patch introduces a function retransmits_timed_out(N),
>> > which calculates the timeout of a TCP connection, assuming an initial
>> > RTO of MIN_RTO and N unsuccessful, exponentially backed-off retransmissions.
>> >
>> > Whenever timeout decisions are made by comparing the retransmission counter
>> > to some value N, this function can be used, instead.
>> >
>> > The meaning of tcp_retries2 will be changed, as many more RTO
>> > retransmissions
>> > can occur than the value indicates. However, it yields a timeout which is
>> > similar to the one of an unpatched, exponentially backing off TCP in the
>> > same
>> > scenario. As no application could rely on an RTO greater than MIN_RTO, there
>> > should be no risk of a regression.
>>
>> This looks like a typical "fix one problem, introducing a few more" patch :(.
>> What do you mean by "no application could rely on an RTO greater than
>> MIN_RTO..."
>> above? How can you make the assumption that RTO is not too far off
>> from TCP_RTO_MIN?
>>
>> While you tried to address a problem where the retransmission count
>> was high but the actual
>> timeout duration was too short, have you considered the other case
>> around, i.e., the timeout
>> duration is long but the retransmission count is too short? This is
>> exactly what's happening
>> to us with your patch. We've much reduced TCP_RTO_MIN for our internal
>> traffic, but not
>> noticing your change has severely shortened the R1 & R2 recommended by
>> RFC1122 for our
>> long haul traffic until now. In many cases R1 threshold was met upon
>> the first retrans timeout.
>>
>> I think retransmits_timed_out() should check against both time
>> duration and retrans count
>> (icsk_retransmits).
>>
>> Thought?
>>
>> Jerry
>>
>> >
>> > Signed-off-by: Damian Lukowski <damian@....rwth-aachen.de>
>> > ---
>> > include/net/tcp.h | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
>> > net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c | 11 +++++++----
>> > 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>> >
>> > diff --git a/include/net/tcp.h b/include/net/tcp.h
>> > index c35b329..17d1a88 100644
>> > --- a/include/net/tcp.h
>> > +++ b/include/net/tcp.h
>> > @@ -1247,6 +1247,24 @@ static inline struct sk_buff
>> > *tcp_write_queue_prev(struct sock *sk, struct sk_bu
>> > #define tcp_for_write_queue_from_safe(skb, tmp, sk) \
>> > skb_queue_walk_from_safe(&(sk)->sk_write_queue, skb, tmp)
>> >
>> > +static inline bool retransmits_timed_out(const struct sock *sk,
>> > + unsigned int boundary)
>> > +{
>> > + int limit, K;
>> > + if (!inet_csk(sk)->icsk_retransmits)
>> > + return false;
>> > +
>> > + K = ilog2(TCP_RTO_MAX/TCP_RTO_MIN);
>> > +
>> > + if (boundary <= K)
>> > + limit = ((2 << boundary) - 1) * TCP_RTO_MIN;
>> > + else
>> > + limit = ((2 << K) - 1) * TCP_RTO_MIN +
>> > + (boundary - K) * TCP_RTO_MAX;
>> > +
>> > + return (tcp_time_stamp - tcp_sk(sk)->retrans_stamp) >= limit;
>> > +}
>> > +
>> > static inline struct sk_buff *tcp_send_head(struct sock *sk)
>> > {
>> > return sk->sk_send_head;
>> > diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c
>> > index a3ba494..2972d7b 100644
>> > --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c
>> > +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c
>> > @@ -137,13 +137,14 @@ static int tcp_write_timeout(struct sock *sk)
>> > {
>> > struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);
>> > int retry_until;
>> > + bool do_reset;
>> >
>> > if ((1 << sk->sk_state) & (TCPF_SYN_SENT | TCPF_SYN_RECV)) {
>> > if (icsk->icsk_retransmits)
>> > dst_negative_advice(&sk->sk_dst_cache);
>> > retry_until = icsk->icsk_syn_retries ? :
>> > sysctl_tcp_syn_retries;
>> > } else {
>> > - if (icsk->icsk_retransmits >= sysctl_tcp_retries1) {
>> > + if (retransmits_timed_out(sk, sysctl_tcp_retries1)) {
>> > /* Black hole detection */
>> > tcp_mtu_probing(icsk, sk);
>> >
>> > @@ -155,13 +156,15 @@ static int tcp_write_timeout(struct sock *sk)
>> > const int alive = (icsk->icsk_rto < TCP_RTO_MAX);
>> >
>> > retry_until = tcp_orphan_retries(sk, alive);
>> > + do_reset = alive ||
>> > + !retransmits_timed_out(sk, retry_until);
>> >
>> > - if (tcp_out_of_resources(sk, alive ||
>> > icsk->icsk_retransmits < retry_until))
>> > + if (tcp_out_of_resources(sk, do_reset))
>> > return 1;
>> > }
>> > }
>> >
>> > - if (icsk->icsk_retransmits >= retry_until) {
>> > + if (retransmits_timed_out(sk, retry_until)) {
>> > /* Has it gone just too far? */
>> > tcp_write_err(sk);
>> > return 1;
>> > @@ -385,7 +388,7 @@ void tcp_retransmit_timer(struct sock *sk)
>> > out_reset_timer:
>> > icsk->icsk_rto = min(icsk->icsk_rto << 1, TCP_RTO_MAX);
>> > inet_csk_reset_xmit_timer(sk, ICSK_TIME_RETRANS, icsk->icsk_rto,
>> > TCP_RTO_MAX);
>> > - if (icsk->icsk_retransmits > sysctl_tcp_retries1)
>> > + if (retransmits_timed_out(sk, sysctl_tcp_retries1 + 1))
>> > __sk_dst_reset(sk);
>> >
>> > out:;
>> > --
>> > 1.6.3.3
>> >
>> > --
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>> >
>
>
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