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Message-ID: <1338864128.17933.2.camel@localhost>
Date: Mon, 04 Jun 2012 22:42:08 -0400
From: Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@...b.auug.org.au>,
linux-next@...r.kernel.org, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
netdev@...r.kernel.org, James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>
Subject: Re: linux-next: Tree for Apr 12
On Mon, 2012-06-04 at 18:46 -0400, Eric Paris wrote:
> On Mon, 2012-06-04 at 15:04 -0700, Andrew Morton wrote:
> > On Thu, 12 Apr 2012 14:24:15 -0700
> > Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org> wrote:
> >
> > > On Thu, 12 Apr 2012 14:59:31 +1000
> > > Stephen Rothwell <sfr@...b.auug.org.au> wrote:
> > >
> > > > I have created today's linux-next tree at
> > > > git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/next/linux-next.git
> > >
> > > This isn't working for me. Some time between April 3 and April 12
> > > someone merged something into the non-mm part of linux-next which broke
> > > ssh.
> > >
> > > I boot the box and everything seems to come up OK, but attemtps to ssh
> > > into the machine fail with
> > >
> > > X11 forwarding request failed on channel 0
> > > Last login: Thu Apr 12 13:04:35 2012 from akpm.corp.google.com
> > > Connection to akpm2 closed.
> > >
> > > I took a peek in the `strace ssh' output.
> > >
> > > Good:
> > >
> > > 17815 write(5, "Last login: Thu Apr 12 13:27:23 "..., 65) = 65
> > > 17815 select(7, [3 4], [], NULL, {120, 0}) = 1 (in [3], left {119, 770798})
> > > 17815 read(3, "\21O\200\366Mv\343\222\332\251\2403L\376Y18\2047\336\244\226p-+X\2%\2119\314\255"..., 8192) = 80
> > > 17815 select(7, [3 4], [5], NULL, {120, 0}) = 1 (out [5], left {119, 999987})
> > > 17815 write(5, "\r\33[m\17\33[27m\33[24m\33[Jakpm2:/home/ak"..., 39) = 39
> > > 17815 select(7, [3 4], [], NULL, {120, 0}) = 1 (in [4], left {118, 801111})
> > > 17815 read(4, "\4", 16384) = 1
> > > 17815 select(7, [3 4], [3], NULL, {120, 0}) = 1 (out [3], left {119, 999991})
> > > 17815 write(3, "\235J\5\340\234\21\266\207\26e\362\327\2\332\1\267\272\200\364\267?/\320L\341\35\350{+M:\222"..., 48) = 48
> > >
> > >
> > > Bad:
> > >
> > > 9305 write(5, "Last login: Thu Apr 12 13:02:54 "..., 65) = 65
> > > 9305 select(7, [3 4], [], NULL, {120, 0}) = 1 (in [3], left {119, 945541})
> > > 9305 read(3, "f\357\250~\260i\2259\320\3258\262)O\364;_\251\360-\314\31\374]\326\300\356\364\370S\3105"..., 8192) = 128
> > > 9305 close(5) = 0
> > > 9305 close(4) = 0
> > >
> > > That read() is returning a lot more data.
> > >
> > > It appears that we've done something which breaks X forwarding. I
> > > won't be able to look any further into this until Monday.
> >
> > This regression is now in mainline. I've bisected it to an SELinux
> > patch, below. I have confirmed that reverting just that patch from
> > current mainline fixes the regression.
> >
> > Using openssh-server-4.3p2-14.fc6 on FC6.
> >
> >
> > commit 95dbf739313f09c8d859bde1373bc264ef979337
> > Author: Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>
> > AuthorDate: Wed Apr 4 13:45:34 2012 -0400
> > Commit: Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>
> > CommitDate: Mon Apr 9 12:22:49 2012 -0400
> >
> > SELinux: check OPEN on truncate calls
> >
> > In RH BZ 578841 we realized that the SELinux sandbox program was allowed to
> > truncate files outside of the sandbox. The reason is because sandbox
> > confinement is determined almost entirely by the 'open' permission. The idea
> > was that if the sandbox was unable to open() files it would be unable to do
> > harm to those files. This turns out to be false in light of syscalls like
> > truncate() and chmod() which don't require a previous open() call. I looked
> > at the syscalls that did not have an associated 'open' check and found that
> > truncate(), did not have a seperate permission and even if it did have a
> > separate permission such a permission owuld be inadequate for use by
> > sandbox (since it owuld have to be granted so liberally as to be useless).
> > This patch checks the OPEN permission on truncate. I think a better solution
> > for sandbox is a whole new permission, but at least this fixes what we have
> > today.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>
> >
> > diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> > index d85b793..f7d7e77 100644
> > --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> > +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> > @@ -2708,6 +2708,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
> > {
> > const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
> > unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid;
> > + __u32 av = FILE__WRITE;
> >
> > /* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */
> > if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) {
> > @@ -2721,7 +2722,10 @@ static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
> > ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET))
> > return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
> >
> > - return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
> > + if (ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE)
> > + av |= FILE__OPEN;
> > +
> > + return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, av);
> > }
> >
> > static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
>
> Very odd indeed... I can only assume you are SELinux enforcing and have
> a denial every time this fails. Can you send me that denial?
>
> I really do not want to revert this and feel that the only right fix is
> going to be to update your selinux policy to allow this new check. I'd
> rather not allow (whatever program) to truncate() files willy-nilly (in
> violation of the intentions of selinux policy)
>
> I'm sorry I never saw it sooner. We've had it in RHEL for even longer
> than the 3 months it's been in -next. I think the 'right' fix is going
> to have to be an update to SELinux policy (for your long dead system, if
> you give me the denial I can build you a new policy) rather than leaving
> the potential security hole in mainline...
Andrew sent me his audit log and it didn't show anything. But it got me
thinking. Now I think this actually is a code bug. Andrew, can you
test this?
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 2e7bd67..20a4315 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -2758,7 +2758,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET))
return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
- if (ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE)
+ if ((ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) && selinux_policycap_openperm)
av |= FILE__OPEN;
return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, av);
--
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