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Message-ID: <2433879.zRVUYBGg1f@jason-thinkpad-t430s>
Date:	Wed, 05 Dec 2012 22:01:31 +0800
From:	Jason Wang <jasowang@...hat.com>
To:	"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@...hat.com>
Cc:	Paul Moore <pmoore@...hat.com>, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, selinux@...ho.nsa.gov
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 2/2] tun: fix LSM/SELinux labeling of tun/tap devices

On Wednesday, December 05, 2012 01:44:55 PM Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
> On Wed, Dec 05, 2012 at 02:19:22PM +0800, Jason Wang wrote:
> > On 12/05/2012 02:17 AM, Paul Moore wrote:
> > > On Tuesday, December 04, 2012 07:36:26 PM Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
> > >> On Tue, Dec 04, 2012 at 11:18:57AM -0500, Paul Moore wrote:
> > >>> Okay, based on your explanation of TUNSETQUEUE, the steps below are
> > >>> what I
> > >>> believe we need to do ... if you disagree speak up quickly please.
> > >>> 
> > >>> A. TUNSETIFF (new, non-persistent device)
> > >>> 
> > >>> [Allocate and initialize the tun_struct LSM state based on the calling
> > >>> process, use this state to label the TUN socket.]
> > >>> 
> > >>> 1. Call security_tun_dev_create() which authorizes the action.
> > >>> 2. Call security_tun_dev_alloc_security() which allocates the
> > >>> tun_struct
> > >>> LSM blob and SELinux sets some internal blob state to record the label
> > >>> of
> > >>> the calling process.
> > >>> 3. Call security_tun_dev_attach() which sets the label of the TUN
> > >>> socket
> > >>> to match the label stored in the tun_struct LSM blob during A2.  No
> > >>> authorization is done at this point since the socket is new/unlabeled.
> > >>> 
> > >>> B. TUNSETIFF (existing, persistent device)
> > >>> 
> > >>> [Relabel the existing tun_struct LSM state based on the calling
> > >>> process,
> > >>> use this state to label the TUN socket.]
> > >>> 
> > >>> 1. Attempt to relabel/reset the tun_struct LSM blob from the currently
> > >>> stored value, set during A2, to the label of the current calling
> > >>> process.
> > >>> *** THIS IS NOT CURRENTLY DONE IN THE RFC PATCH ***
> > >>> 2. Call security_tun_dev_attach() which sets the label of the TUN
> > >>> socket
> > >>> to match the label stored in the tun_struct LSM blob during B1. No
> > >>> authorization is done at this point since the socket is new/unlabeled.
> > >>> 
> > >>> C. TUNSETQUEUE
> > >>> 
> > >>> [Use the existing tun_struct LSM state to label the new TUN socket.]
> > >>> 
> > >>> 1. Call security_tun_dev_attach() which sets the label of the TUN
> > >>> socket
> > >>> to match the label stored in the tun_struct LSM blob set during either
> > >>> A2
> > >>> or B1. No authorization is done at this point since the socket is
> > >>> new/unlabeled.
> > >> 
> > >> Here's what bothers me. libvirt currently opens tun and passes
> > >> fd to qemu. What would prevent qemu from attaching fd using TUNSETQUEUE
> > >> to another device it does not own?
> > > 
> > > True, assuming all the above is correct and that I'm understanding it
> > > correctly (Jason?), we should probably add a new SELinux access control
> > > for
> > > TUNSETQUEUE.
> > 
> > Yes, we need make sure qemu can call TUNSETQUEUE for the device it does
> > not own.
> 
> Meaning can *not* call?

Sorry for not being clear, I mean qemu can call TUNSETQUEUE for the device it 
owns and for the device it does not own, it can't call.
> 
> > > The current DAC code exists in tun_not_capable().
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