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Message-Id: <20121207.132019.1647690876686095833.davem@davemloft.net>
Date: Fri, 07 Dec 2012 13:20:19 -0500 (EST)
From: David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>
To: ncardwell@...gle.com
Cc: edumazet@...gle.com, netdev@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH net] inet_diag: fix oops for IPv4 AF_INET6 TCP SYN-RECV
state
From: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@...gle.com>
Date: Thu, 6 Dec 2012 10:42:26 -0500
> Fix inet_diag to be aware of the fact that AF_INET6 TCP connections
> instantiated for IPv4 traffic and in the SYN-RECV state were actually
> created with inet_reqsk_alloc(), instead of inet6_reqsk_alloc(). This
> means that for such connections inet6_rsk(req) returns a pointer to a
> random spot in memory up to roughly 64KB beyond the end of the
> request_sock.
>
> With this bug, for a server using AF_INET6 TCP sockets and serving
> IPv4 traffic, an inet_diag user like `ss state SYN-RECV` would lead to
> inet_diag_fill_req() causing an oops or the export to user space of 16
> bytes of kernel memory as a garbage IPv6 address, depending on where
> the garbage inet6_rsk(req) pointed.
>
> Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@...gle.com>
Thanks for this fix, but it opens up more questions.
We don't seem to make any validations upon inet_diag_hostcond's
prefix_len. That parameter we pass into bitstring_match() can
be just about anything.
As another example, what if we do an ipv6 128-bit compare on what's
actually an ipv4 address in the inet request sock?
I think we need to, using cond->family, make some kind of validations
upon cond->prefix_len.
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