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Message-ID: <1356118052.21834.7793.camel@edumazet-glaptop>
Date: Fri, 21 Dec 2012 11:27:32 -0800
From: Eric Dumazet <erdnetdev@...il.com>
To: Zhiyun Qian <zhiyunq@...ch.edu>
Cc: netdev@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: TCP sequence number inference attack on Linux
On Fri, 2012-12-21 at 14:10 -0500, Zhiyun Qian wrote:
> That's good to know. However, implementing RFC 5961 alone is not
> sufficient. Like I said, since DelayedAckLost counter is incremented
> purely upon looking at the sequence number, regardless of the ACK
> number. An attacker thus can still infer the sequence number based on
> DelayedAckLost counter without knowing the right ACK number.
>
> The next question is how can the attacker eventually know the right
> ACK number in order to inject real data. It turns out that this is not
> hard either. First, based on the current Linux TCP stack, it accepts
> incoming packets without ACK flag.
I dont really think so.
We must discard frame is th->ack is not set. (Step 5, line 6142)
> Further, if ACK flag is not set,
> ACK number will not be checked at all. See code in
> net/ipv4/tcp_input.c, function tcp_rcv_established()
>
> 5547 if (th->ack && tcp_ack(sk, skb, FLAG_SLOWPATH) < 0)
> 5548 goto discard;
>
> Second, even if ACK number is always checked before accepting the
> payload, it is still possible to infer the ACK number much like how
> sequence number can be inferred. The details is described in Section
> 3.4 of my paper, paragraph starting with "Client-side sequence number
> inference".
>
> I'm looking at the latest kernel v3.7.1 right now. I believe the
> problem do still exist in today's Linux.
>
It seems you know pretty well this code, I wonder why you dont send
patches to fix the bugs...
Its not like it has to be buggy forever.
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