netdev - Re: Unix Socket buffer attribution

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Message-ID: <CAJ4BwwG-fimMeSD_DSNZZz=Vjz3Qk_58qEnMGv_gmn0rTSeZAg@mail.gmail.com>
Date:	Wed, 23 Jan 2013 11:36:49 -0500
From:	Yannick Koehler <yannick@...hler.name>
To:	Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@...il.com>
Cc:	Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@...il.com>, netdev@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: Unix Socket buffer attribution

> So what prevents a malicious program to DOS the machine ?

The recv queue (checked with recvq_full()) and receiving's socket
rcvbuf (check added in my patch).

Actually the current situation can easily lead to a DOS situation.  I
simply have to write one application that connect to a unix socket
domain and have it send me data for which I never call recvfrom() and
voilà, all other consumer of this unix socket application will no more
be able to communicate with this application once it maxed out it's
sndbuf, default is 128k I believe.

I will submit my patch in my next email.

--
Yannick Koehler
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