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Message-ID: <511A631A.60803@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 12 Feb 2013 10:43:22 -0500
From: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@...il.com>
To: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@...hat.com>
CC: davem@...emloft.net, linux-sctp@...r.kernel.org,
netdev@...r.kernel.org, Neil Horman <nhorman@...driver.com>,
Vlad Yasevich <vyasevic@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH net-next v2] net: sctp: remove unused multiple cookie
keys
On 02/12/2013 10:15 AM, Daniel Borkmann wrote:
> Vlad says: The whole multiple cookie keys code is completely unused
> and has been all this time. Noone uses anything other then the
> secret_key[0] since there is no changeover support anywhere.
>
> Thus, for now clean up its left-over fragments.
>
> Cc: Neil Horman <nhorman@...driver.com>
> Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevic@...hat.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@...il.com>
Thanks
-vlad
> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@...hat.com>
> ---
> include/net/sctp/constants.h | 2 +-
> include/net/sctp/structs.h | 5 +----
> net/sctp/endpointola.c | 9 ++-------
> net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c | 31 +++++++------------------------
> 4 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/net/sctp/constants.h b/include/net/sctp/constants.h
> index c29707d..a7dd5c5 100644
> --- a/include/net/sctp/constants.h
> +++ b/include/net/sctp/constants.h
> @@ -303,7 +303,7 @@ enum { SCTP_MAX_GABS = 16 };
> * to which we will raise the P-MTU.
> */
> #define SCTP_DEFAULT_MINSEGMENT 512 /* MTU size ... if no mtu disc */
> -#define SCTP_HOW_MANY_SECRETS 2 /* How many secrets I keep */
> +
> #define SCTP_SECRET_SIZE 32 /* Number of octets in a 256 bits. */
>
> #define SCTP_SIGNATURE_SIZE 20 /* size of a SLA-1 signature */
> diff --git a/include/net/sctp/structs.h b/include/net/sctp/structs.h
> index fdeb85a..0e0f9d2 100644
> --- a/include/net/sctp/structs.h
> +++ b/include/net/sctp/structs.h
> @@ -1236,10 +1236,7 @@ struct sctp_endpoint {
> * Discussion in [RFC1750] can be helpful in
> * selection of the key.
> */
> - __u8 secret_key[SCTP_HOW_MANY_SECRETS][SCTP_SECRET_SIZE];
> - int current_key;
> - int last_key;
> - int key_changed_at;
> + __u8 secret_key[SCTP_SECRET_SIZE];
>
> /* digest: This is a digest of the sctp cookie. This field is
> * only used on the receive path when we try to validate
> diff --git a/net/sctp/endpointola.c b/net/sctp/endpointola.c
> index 1a9c5fb..73aad3d 100644
> --- a/net/sctp/endpointola.c
> +++ b/net/sctp/endpointola.c
> @@ -151,9 +151,7 @@ static struct sctp_endpoint *sctp_endpoint_init(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
> ep->rcvbuf_policy = net->sctp.rcvbuf_policy;
>
> /* Initialize the secret key used with cookie. */
> - get_random_bytes(&ep->secret_key[0], SCTP_SECRET_SIZE);
> - ep->last_key = ep->current_key = 0;
> - ep->key_changed_at = jiffies;
> + get_random_bytes(ep->secret_key, sizeof(ep->secret_key));
>
> /* SCTP-AUTH extensions*/
> INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ep->endpoint_shared_keys);
> @@ -249,8 +247,6 @@ void sctp_endpoint_free(struct sctp_endpoint *ep)
> /* Final destructor for endpoint. */
> static void sctp_endpoint_destroy(struct sctp_endpoint *ep)
> {
> - int i;
> -
> SCTP_ASSERT(ep->base.dead, "Endpoint is not dead", return);
>
> /* Free up the HMAC transform. */
> @@ -273,8 +269,7 @@ static void sctp_endpoint_destroy(struct sctp_endpoint *ep)
> sctp_inq_free(&ep->base.inqueue);
> sctp_bind_addr_free(&ep->base.bind_addr);
>
> - for (i = 0; i < SCTP_HOW_MANY_SECRETS; ++i)
> - memset(&ep->secret_key[i], 0, SCTP_SECRET_SIZE);
> + memset(ep->secret_key, 0, sizeof(ep->secret_key));
>
> /* Remove and free the port */
> if (sctp_sk(ep->base.sk)->bind_hash)
> diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
> index e1c5fc2..a193f3b 100644
> --- a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
> +++ b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
> @@ -1589,8 +1589,6 @@ static sctp_cookie_param_t *sctp_pack_cookie(const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
> struct sctp_signed_cookie *cookie;
> struct scatterlist sg;
> int headersize, bodysize;
> - unsigned int keylen;
> - char *key;
>
> /* Header size is static data prior to the actual cookie, including
> * any padding.
> @@ -1650,12 +1648,11 @@ static sctp_cookie_param_t *sctp_pack_cookie(const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
>
> /* Sign the message. */
> sg_init_one(&sg, &cookie->c, bodysize);
> - keylen = SCTP_SECRET_SIZE;
> - key = (char *)ep->secret_key[ep->current_key];
> desc.tfm = sctp_sk(ep->base.sk)->hmac;
> desc.flags = 0;
>
> - if (crypto_hash_setkey(desc.tfm, key, keylen) ||
> + if (crypto_hash_setkey(desc.tfm, ep->secret_key,
> + sizeof(ep->secret_key)) ||
> crypto_hash_digest(&desc, &sg, bodysize, cookie->signature))
> goto free_cookie;
> }
> @@ -1682,8 +1679,7 @@ struct sctp_association *sctp_unpack_cookie(
> int headersize, bodysize, fixed_size;
> __u8 *digest = ep->digest;
> struct scatterlist sg;
> - unsigned int keylen, len;
> - char *key;
> + unsigned int len;
> sctp_scope_t scope;
> struct sk_buff *skb = chunk->skb;
> struct timeval tv;
> @@ -1718,34 +1714,21 @@ struct sctp_association *sctp_unpack_cookie(
> goto no_hmac;
>
> /* Check the signature. */
> - keylen = SCTP_SECRET_SIZE;
> sg_init_one(&sg, bear_cookie, bodysize);
> - key = (char *)ep->secret_key[ep->current_key];
> desc.tfm = sctp_sk(ep->base.sk)->hmac;
> desc.flags = 0;
>
> memset(digest, 0x00, SCTP_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
> - if (crypto_hash_setkey(desc.tfm, key, keylen) ||
> + if (crypto_hash_setkey(desc.tfm, ep->secret_key,
> + sizeof(ep->secret_key)) ||
> crypto_hash_digest(&desc, &sg, bodysize, digest)) {
> *error = -SCTP_IERROR_NOMEM;
> goto fail;
> }
>
> if (memcmp(digest, cookie->signature, SCTP_SIGNATURE_SIZE)) {
> - /* Try the previous key. */
> - key = (char *)ep->secret_key[ep->last_key];
> - memset(digest, 0x00, SCTP_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
> - if (crypto_hash_setkey(desc.tfm, key, keylen) ||
> - crypto_hash_digest(&desc, &sg, bodysize, digest)) {
> - *error = -SCTP_IERROR_NOMEM;
> - goto fail;
> - }
> -
> - if (memcmp(digest, cookie->signature, SCTP_SIGNATURE_SIZE)) {
> - /* Yikes! Still bad signature! */
> - *error = -SCTP_IERROR_BAD_SIG;
> - goto fail;
> - }
> + *error = -SCTP_IERROR_BAD_SIG;
> + goto fail;
> }
>
> no_hmac:
>
--
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