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Message-ID: <1363616388.29093.201.camel@zion.uk.xensource.com>
Date: Mon, 18 Mar 2013 14:19:48 +0000
From: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@...rix.com>
To: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@...rix.com>
CC: <wei.liu2@...rix.com>, Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@...rix.com>,
"netdev@...r.kernel.org" <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
"xen-devel@...ts.xen.org" <xen-devel@...ts.xen.org>,
"annie.li@...cle.com" <annie.li@...cle.com>,
"konrad.wilk@...cle.com" <konrad.wilk@...cle.com>
Subject: Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 2/4] xen-netfront: drop skb when skb->len >
65535
On Mon, 2013-03-18 at 14:00 +0000, David Vrabel wrote:
> On 18/03/13 13:48, Ian Campbell wrote:
> > On Mon, 2013-03-18 at 13:46 +0000, David Vrabel wrote:
> >> On 18/03/13 10:35, Wei Liu wrote:
> >>> The `size' field of Xen network wire format is uint16_t, anything bigger than
> >>> 65535 will cause overflow.
> >>
> >> The backend needs to be able to handle these bad packets without
> >> disconnecting the VIF -- we can't fix all the frontend drivers.
> >
> > Agreed, although that doesn't imply that we shouldn't fix the frontend
> > where we can -- such as upstream as Wei does here.
>
> Yes, frontends should be fixed where possible.
>
> This is what I came up with for the backend. I don't have time to look
> into it further but, Wei, feel free to use it as a starting point.
>
Thanks for this patch.
I haven't gone through XSA-39 discussion, this is why I didn't come up
with a fix for backend -- I need to make sure dropping packet like this
won't re-exhibit the security hole.
Wei.
> David
>
> diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c
> b/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c
> index cd49ba9..18e2671 100644
> --- a/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c
> +++ b/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c
> @@ -899,10 +899,11 @@ static void netbk_fatal_tx_err(struct xenvif *vif)
> static int netbk_count_requests(struct xenvif *vif,
> struct xen_netif_tx_request *first,
> struct xen_netif_tx_request *txp,
> - int work_to_do)
> + int work_to_do, int idx)
> {
> RING_IDX cons = vif->tx.req_cons;
> int frags = 0;
> + bool drop = false;
>
> if (!(first->flags & XEN_NETTXF_more_data))
> return 0;
> @@ -922,10 +923,20 @@ static int netbk_count_requests(struct xenvif *vif,
>
> memcpy(txp, RING_GET_REQUEST(&vif->tx, cons + frags),
> sizeof(*txp));
> - if (txp->size > first->size) {
> - netdev_err(vif->dev, "Frag is bigger than frame.\n");
> - netbk_fatal_tx_err(vif);
> - return -EIO;
> +
> + /*
> + * If the guest submitted a frame >= 64 KiB then
> + * first->size overflowed and following frags will
> + * appear to be larger than the frame.
> + *
> + * This cannot be a fatal error as there are buggy
> + * frontends that do this.
> + *
> + * Consume all the frags and drop the packet.
> + */
> + if (!drop && txp->size > first->size) {
> + netdev_dbg(vif->dev, "Frag is bigger than frame.\n");
> + drop = true;
> }
>
> first->size -= txp->size;
> @@ -938,6 +949,12 @@ static int netbk_count_requests(struct xenvif *vif,
> return -EINVAL;
> }
> } while ((txp++)->flags & XEN_NETTXF_more_data);
> +
> + if (drop) {
> + netbk_tx_err(vif, txp, idx + frags);
> + return -EIO;
> + }
> +
> return frags;
> }
>
> @@ -1327,7 +1344,7 @@ static unsigned xen_netbk_tx_build_gops(struct
> xen_netbk *netbk)
> continue;
> }
>
> - ret = netbk_count_requests(vif, &txreq, txfrags, work_to_do);
> + ret = netbk_count_requests(vif, &txreq, txfrags, work_to_do, idx);
> if (unlikely(ret < 0))
> continue;
>
--
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