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Message-Id: <3d7ffb6d9b73971f1a526fc490ef84ef7a33eecc.1363815201.git.luto@amacapital.net>
Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2013 14:38:38 -0700
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
To: netdev@...r.kernel.org
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
containers@...ts.linux-foundation.org,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
Subject: [PATCH 1/3] net: Clean up SCM_CREDENTIALS code
I was curious whether the uids, gids, and pids passed around worked
correctly in the presence of multiple namespaces. I gave up trying
to figure it out: there are two copies of the pid (one of which has
type u32, which is odd), a struct cred * (!), and a separate kuid
and kgid. IOW, all of the relevant data is stored twice, and it's
unclear which copy is used when.
I also wondered what prevented a SO_CREDENTIALS message from being
recieved when the credentials weren't filled out. Answer: not very
much (and there have been serious security bugs here in the past).
So just rewrite the thing to store a pid_t relative to the init pid
ns, a kuid, and a kgid, and to explicitly track whether the data is
filled out.
I haven't played with the secid code. I have no idea whether it has
similar problems.
I haven't benchmarked this, but it should be a respectable speedup
in the cases where the credentials are in use.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
---
Before, the program below printed this:
$ passcred
My pid = 19873
No SO_PASSCRED: uid=65534 gid=65534 pid=0 [this is a bug]
SO_PASSCRED: uid=1000 gid=1000 pid=19873
SO_PASSCRED, forked to pid 19874: uid=1000 gid=1000 pid=19874
# passcred
My pid = 19886
No SO_PASSCRED: uid=65534 gid=65534 pid=0
SO_PASSCRED: uid=0 gid=0 pid=19886
SO_PASSCRED, forked to pid 19887: uid=0 gid=0 pid=19887
After:
# passcred
My pid = 83
No creds received
SO_PASSCRED: uid=0 gid=0 pid=83
SO_PASSCRED, forked to pid 84: uid=0 gid=0 pid=0
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdbool.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <err.h>
static void send_str(int fd, const char *msg)
{
if (send(fd, msg, strlen(msg)+1, 0) < 0)
err(1, "send");
}
int main()
{
int fds[2];
if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_DGRAM, 0, fds))
err(1, "socketpair");
send_str(fds[1], "No SO_PASSCRED");
int one = 1;
if (setsockopt(fds[0], SOL_SOCKET, SO_PASSCRED, &one, sizeof(one)) != 0)
err(1, "SO_PASSCRED");
send_str(fds[1], "SO_PASSCRED");
if (fork() == 0) {
char msg[1024];
sprintf(msg, "SO_PASSCRED, forked to pid %ld", (long)getpid());
send_str(fds[1], msg);
return 0;
}
int status;
wait(&status);
printf("My pid = %ld\n", getpid());
for (int i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
char buf[1024];
char cbuf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(struct ucred))];
struct iovec iov;
iov.iov_base = &buf;
iov.iov_len = sizeof(buf);
struct msghdr hdr;
memset(&hdr, 0, sizeof(hdr));
hdr.msg_iov = &iov;
hdr.msg_iovlen = 1;
hdr.msg_control = cbuf;
hdr.msg_controllen = sizeof(cbuf);
ssize_t bytes = recvmsg(fds[0], &hdr, 0);
if (bytes < 0)
err(1, "recvmsg");
if (hdr.msg_flags & (MSG_TRUNC | MSG_CTRUNC))
errx(1, "truncated");
struct ucred cred;
bool ok = false;
for (struct cmsghdr *cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&hdr); cmsg; cmsg = CMSG_NXTHDR(&hdr, cmsg)) {
if (cmsg->cmsg_level == SOL_SOCKET &&
cmsg->cmsg_type == SCM_CREDENTIALS) {
cred = *((struct ucred *)CMSG_DATA(cmsg));
ok = true;
break;
}
}
if (!ok) {
printf("No creds received\n");
} else {
printf("%s: uid=%ld gid=%ld pid=%ld\n",
buf, (long)cred.uid, (long)cred.gid, (long)cred.pid);
}
}
return 0;
}
include/net/af_unix.h | 6 ++--
include/net/scm.h | 83 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
net/core/scm.c | 49 ++++++++++------------------
net/netlink/af_netlink.c | 14 +++++---
net/unix/af_unix.c | 35 +++++++++-----------
5 files changed, 99 insertions(+), 88 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/net/af_unix.h b/include/net/af_unix.h
index 0a996a3..7874f3e 100644
--- a/include/net/af_unix.h
+++ b/include/net/af_unix.h
@@ -27,12 +27,12 @@ struct unix_address {
struct sockaddr_un name[0];
};
+/* This structure is identical to struct scm_cookie. */
struct unix_skb_parms {
- struct pid *pid; /* Skb credentials */
- const struct cred *cred;
+ struct scm_creds creds;
struct scm_fp_list *fp; /* Passed files */
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
- u32 secid; /* Security ID */
+ u32 secid; /* Passed security ID */
#endif
};
diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
index 975cca0..f6f0626 100644
--- a/include/net/scm.h
+++ b/include/net/scm.h
@@ -13,9 +13,24 @@
#define SCM_MAX_FD 253
struct scm_creds {
- u32 pid;
- kuid_t uid;
- kgid_t gid;
+ bool has_creds;
+
+ /*
+ * Keeping reference counts (as to a struct pid *) in here is
+ * annoying -- things like skb_set_owner_[rw] and skb_clone assume
+ * that it's ok to memcpy skb->cb around.
+ *
+ * Fortunately (?) anything that uses the pid field in SCM_CREDENTIALS
+ * is fundamentally racy, since the networking code certainly isn't
+ * going to keep a reference alive *after* recvmsg. So let's embrace
+ * the race condition at the cost of an extra hash lookup on receive.
+ *
+ * (There's an added benefit here: this approach doesn't write to
+ * any shared cachelines.)
+ */
+ pid_t init_ns_pid;
+ kuid_t uid;
+ kgid_t gid;
};
struct scm_fp_list {
@@ -25,15 +40,15 @@ struct scm_fp_list {
};
struct scm_cookie {
- struct pid *pid; /* Skb credentials */
- const struct cred *cred;
+ struct scm_creds creds;
struct scm_fp_list *fp; /* Passed files */
- struct scm_creds creds; /* Skb credentials */
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
u32 secid; /* Passed security ID */
#endif
};
+#define SCM_COOKIE_INIT {} /* All zeros is good. */
+
extern void scm_detach_fds(struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm);
extern void scm_detach_fds_compat(struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm);
extern int __scm_send(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm);
@@ -50,39 +65,47 @@ static __inline__ void unix_get_peersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct scm_co
{ }
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
-static __inline__ void scm_set_cred(struct scm_cookie *scm,
- struct pid *pid, const struct cred *cred)
+static __inline__ bool scm_creds_equal(const struct scm_creds *a,
+ const struct scm_creds *b)
{
- scm->pid = get_pid(pid);
- scm->cred = cred ? get_cred(cred) : NULL;
- scm->creds.pid = pid_vnr(pid);
- scm->creds.uid = cred ? cred->euid : INVALID_UID;
- scm->creds.gid = cred ? cred->egid : INVALID_GID;
+ if (a->has_creds)
+ return a->init_ns_pid == b->init_ns_pid &&
+ uid_eq(a->uid, b->uid) && gid_eq(a->gid, b->gid);
+ else
+ return !b->has_creds;
}
-static __inline__ void scm_destroy_cred(struct scm_cookie *scm)
+static __inline__ void scm_creds_from_current(struct scm_creds *creds)
{
- put_pid(scm->pid);
- scm->pid = NULL;
+ const struct cred *cred = get_current_cred();
+ creds->has_creds = true;
+ creds->init_ns_pid = task_tgid_nr(current);
+ creds->uid = cred->uid;
+ creds->gid = cred->gid;
+}
- if (scm->cred)
- put_cred(scm->cred);
- scm->cred = NULL;
+static __inline__ void scm_creds_from_kernel(struct scm_creds *creds)
+{
+ creds->has_creds = true;
+ creds->init_ns_pid = 0;
+ creds->uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID;
+ creds->gid = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID;
+}
+
+static __inline__ void scm_creds_wipe(struct scm_creds *creds)
+{
+ creds->has_creds = false;
}
static __inline__ void scm_destroy(struct scm_cookie *scm)
{
- scm_destroy_cred(scm);
if (scm->fp)
__scm_destroy(scm);
}
static __inline__ int scm_send(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
- struct scm_cookie *scm, bool forcecreds)
+ struct scm_cookie *scm)
{
- memset(scm, 0, sizeof(*scm));
- if (forcecreds)
- scm_set_cred(scm, task_tgid(current), current_cred());
unix_get_peersec_dgram(sock, scm);
if (msg->msg_controllen <= 0)
return 0;
@@ -120,18 +143,22 @@ static __inline__ void scm_recv(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
return;
}
- if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSCRED, &sock->flags)) {
+ if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSCRED, &sock->flags) && scm->creds.has_creds) {
struct user_namespace *current_ns = current_user_ns();
struct ucred ucreds = {
- .pid = scm->creds.pid,
.uid = from_kuid_munged(current_ns, scm->creds.uid),
.gid = from_kgid_munged(current_ns, scm->creds.gid),
};
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ /* On error, this will result in pid 0. */
+ ucreds.pid = pid_vnr(find_pid_ns(scm->creds.init_ns_pid,
+ &init_pid_ns));
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_CREDENTIALS, sizeof(ucreds), &ucreds);
}
- scm_destroy_cred(scm);
-
scm_passec(sock, msg, scm);
if (!scm->fp)
diff --git a/net/core/scm.c b/net/core/scm.c
index 905dcc6..7dd7534 100644
--- a/net/core/scm.c
+++ b/net/core/scm.c
@@ -157,8 +157,7 @@ int __scm_send(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *p)
case SCM_CREDENTIALS:
{
struct ucred creds;
- kuid_t uid;
- kgid_t gid;
+ struct pid *pid;
if (cmsg->cmsg_len != CMSG_LEN(sizeof(struct ucred)))
goto error;
memcpy(&creds, CMSG_DATA(cmsg), sizeof(struct ucred));
@@ -166,41 +165,25 @@ int __scm_send(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *p)
if (err)
goto error;
- p->creds.pid = creds.pid;
- if (!p->pid || pid_vnr(p->pid) != creds.pid) {
- struct pid *pid;
- err = -ESRCH;
- pid = find_get_pid(creds.pid);
- if (!pid)
- goto error;
- put_pid(p->pid);
- p->pid = pid;
- }
-
err = -EINVAL;
- uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), creds.uid);
- gid = make_kgid(current_user_ns(), creds.gid);
- if (!uid_valid(uid) || !gid_valid(gid))
+ p->creds.uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), creds.uid);
+ p->creds.gid = make_kgid(current_user_ns(), creds.gid);
+ if (!uid_valid(p->creds.uid) ||
+ !gid_valid(p->creds.gid))
goto error;
- p->creds.uid = uid;
- p->creds.gid = gid;
-
- if (!p->cred ||
- !uid_eq(p->cred->euid, uid) ||
- !gid_eq(p->cred->egid, gid)) {
- struct cred *cred;
- err = -ENOMEM;
- cred = prepare_creds();
- if (!cred)
- goto error;
-
- cred->uid = cred->euid = uid;
- cred->gid = cred->egid = gid;
- if (p->cred)
- put_cred(p->cred);
- p->cred = cred;
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ pid = find_vpid(creds.pid);
+ if (!pid) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ err = -ESRCH;
+ goto error;
}
+ p->creds.init_ns_pid = pid_nr(pid);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ p->creds.has_creds = true;
+
break;
}
default:
diff --git a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
index 1e3fd5b..8245f61 100644
--- a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
+++ b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
@@ -936,7 +936,6 @@ static int netlink_unicast_kernel(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
if (nlk->netlink_rcv != NULL) {
ret = skb->len;
skb_set_owner_r(skb, sk);
- NETLINK_CB(skb).ssk = ssk;
nlk->netlink_rcv(skb);
consume_skb(skb);
} else {
@@ -1368,7 +1367,7 @@ static int netlink_sendmsg(struct kiocb *kiocb, struct socket *sock,
u32 dst_group;
struct sk_buff *skb;
int err;
- struct scm_cookie scm;
+ struct scm_cookie scm = SCM_COOKIE_INIT;
if (msg->msg_flags&MSG_OOB)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
@@ -1376,7 +1375,8 @@ static int netlink_sendmsg(struct kiocb *kiocb, struct socket *sock,
if (NULL == siocb->scm)
siocb->scm = &scm;
- err = scm_send(sock, msg, siocb->scm, true);
+ scm_creds_from_current(&siocb->scm->creds);
+ err = scm_send(sock, msg, siocb->scm);
if (err < 0)
return err;
@@ -1411,7 +1411,9 @@ static int netlink_sendmsg(struct kiocb *kiocb, struct socket *sock,
NETLINK_CB(skb).portid = nlk->portid;
NETLINK_CB(skb).dst_group = dst_group;
- NETLINK_CB(skb).creds = siocb->scm->creds;
+
+ /* This is mandatory. See netlink_recvmsg. */
+ NETLINK_CB(skb).creds = siocb->scm->creds;
err = -EFAULT;
if (memcpy_fromiovec(skb_put(skb, len), msg->msg_iov, len)) {
@@ -1504,7 +1506,11 @@ static int netlink_recvmsg(struct kiocb *kiocb, struct socket *sock,
memset(&scm, 0, sizeof(scm));
siocb->scm = &scm;
}
+ /* skbs without creds are from the kernel. */
siocb->scm->creds = *NETLINK_CREDS(skb);
+ if (!siocb->scm->creds.has_creds)
+ scm_creds_from_kernel(&siocb->scm->creds);
+
if (flags & MSG_TRUNC)
copied = data_skb->len;
diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
index 51be64f..0881739 100644
--- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
+++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
@@ -1338,10 +1338,8 @@ static void unix_detach_fds(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
static void unix_destruct_scm(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- struct scm_cookie scm;
- memset(&scm, 0, sizeof(scm));
- scm.pid = UNIXCB(skb).pid;
- scm.cred = UNIXCB(skb).cred;
+ struct scm_cookie scm = SCM_COOKIE_INIT;
+ scm.creds = UNIXCB(skb).creds;
if (UNIXCB(skb).fp)
unix_detach_fds(&scm, skb);
@@ -1391,9 +1389,7 @@ static int unix_scm_to_skb(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb, bool sen
{
int err = 0;
- UNIXCB(skb).pid = get_pid(scm->pid);
- if (scm->cred)
- UNIXCB(skb).cred = get_cred(scm->cred);
+ UNIXCB(skb).creds = scm->creds;
UNIXCB(skb).fp = NULL;
if (scm->fp && send_fds)
err = unix_attach_fds(scm, skb);
@@ -1410,13 +1406,12 @@ static int unix_scm_to_skb(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb, bool sen
static void maybe_add_creds(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct socket *sock,
const struct sock *other)
{
- if (UNIXCB(skb).cred)
+ if (UNIXCB(skb).creds.has_creds)
return;
if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSCRED, &sock->flags) ||
!other->sk_socket ||
test_bit(SOCK_PASSCRED, &other->sk_socket->flags)) {
- UNIXCB(skb).pid = get_pid(task_tgid(current));
- UNIXCB(skb).cred = get_current_cred();
+ scm_creds_from_current(&UNIXCB(skb).creds);
}
}
@@ -1438,14 +1433,14 @@ static int unix_dgram_sendmsg(struct kiocb *kiocb, struct socket *sock,
unsigned int hash;
struct sk_buff *skb;
long timeo;
- struct scm_cookie tmp_scm;
+ struct scm_cookie tmp_scm = SCM_COOKIE_INIT;
int max_level;
int data_len = 0;
if (NULL == siocb->scm)
siocb->scm = &tmp_scm;
wait_for_unix_gc();
- err = scm_send(sock, msg, siocb->scm, false);
+ err = scm_send(sock, msg, siocb->scm);
if (err < 0)
return err;
@@ -1607,14 +1602,14 @@ static int unix_stream_sendmsg(struct kiocb *kiocb, struct socket *sock,
int err, size;
struct sk_buff *skb;
int sent = 0;
- struct scm_cookie tmp_scm;
+ struct scm_cookie tmp_scm = SCM_COOKIE_INIT;
bool fds_sent = false;
int max_level;
if (NULL == siocb->scm)
siocb->scm = &tmp_scm;
wait_for_unix_gc();
- err = scm_send(sock, msg, siocb->scm, false);
+ err = scm_send(sock, msg, siocb->scm);
if (err < 0)
return err;
@@ -1765,7 +1760,7 @@ static int unix_dgram_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
int flags)
{
struct sock_iocb *siocb = kiocb_to_siocb(iocb);
- struct scm_cookie tmp_scm;
+ struct scm_cookie tmp_scm = SCM_COOKIE_INIT;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct unix_sock *u = unix_sk(sk);
int noblock = flags & MSG_DONTWAIT;
@@ -1820,7 +1815,7 @@ static int unix_dgram_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
siocb->scm = &tmp_scm;
memset(&tmp_scm, 0, sizeof(tmp_scm));
}
- scm_set_cred(siocb->scm, UNIXCB(skb).pid, UNIXCB(skb).cred);
+ siocb->scm->creds = UNIXCB(skb).creds;
unix_set_secdata(siocb->scm, skb);
if (!(flags & MSG_PEEK)) {
@@ -1898,7 +1893,7 @@ static int unix_stream_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
int flags)
{
struct sock_iocb *siocb = kiocb_to_siocb(iocb);
- struct scm_cookie tmp_scm;
+ struct scm_cookie tmp_scm = SCM_COOKIE_INIT;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct unix_sock *u = unix_sk(sk);
struct sockaddr_un *sunaddr = msg->msg_name;
@@ -1991,12 +1986,12 @@ again:
if (check_creds) {
/* Never glue messages from different writers */
- if ((UNIXCB(skb).pid != siocb->scm->pid) ||
- (UNIXCB(skb).cred != siocb->scm->cred))
+ if (!scm_creds_equal(&UNIXCB(skb).creds,
+ &siocb->scm->creds));
break;
} else {
/* Copy credentials */
- scm_set_cred(siocb->scm, UNIXCB(skb).pid, UNIXCB(skb).cred);
+ siocb->scm->creds = UNIXCB(skb).creds;
check_creds = 1;
}
--
1.8.1.4
--
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