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Message-ID: <31036542.d4Dp22e6Ij@sifl>
Date: Mon, 08 Apr 2013 14:32 -0400
From: Paul Moore <pmoore@...hat.com>
To: David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@...il.com>, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
mvadkert@...hat.com, selinux@...ho.nsa.gov,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] tcp: assign the sock correctly to an outgoing SYNACK packet
On Monday, April 08, 2013 02:12:01 PM Paul Moore wrote:
> On Monday, April 08, 2013 10:47:47 AM Eric Dumazet wrote:
> > On Mon, 2013-04-08 at 13:40 -0400, Paul Moore wrote:
> > > Sort of a similar problem, but not really the same. Also, arguably,
> > > there is no real associated sock/socket for a RST so orphaning the
> > > packet makes sense. In the case of a SYNACK we can, and should,
> > > associate the packet with a sock/socket.
> >
> > What is the intent ?
>
> We have to do a number of painful things in SELinux because we aren't
> allowed a proper security blob (void *security) in a sk_buff. One of those
> things ...
Actually, I wonder if this problem means it is a good time to revisit the no-
security-blob-in-sk_buff decision? The management of the blob would be hidden
behind the LSM hooks like everything else and it would have a number of
advantages including making problems like we are seeing here easier to fix or
avoid entirely. It would also make life much easier for those of working on
LSM stuff and it would pave the way for including network access controls in
the stacked-LSM stuff Casey is kicking around.
I'm aware of all the arguments against, but thought it would be worth bringing
it up again, if for no other reason than I haven't heard enough shouting yet
today :)
--
paul moore
security and virtualization @ redhat
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