[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <1365454501.3887.45.camel@edumazet-glaptop>
Date: Mon, 08 Apr 2013 13:55:01 -0700
From: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@...il.com>
To: Paul Moore <pmoore@...hat.com>
Cc: David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
mvadkert@...hat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH] tcp: assign the sock correctly to an outgoing SYNACK
packet
On Mon, 2013-04-08 at 16:37 -0400, Paul Moore wrote:
> The people who use this functionality almost never use upstream kernels, they
> need to protection/certification/warm-fuzzies/etc. that come from a
> distribution kernel and a support infrastructure. I didn't catch it because I
> use a slightly different configuration that didn't expose this bug; while I
> would like to run a full regression test every release I simply don't have the
> time to do that myself.
>
> > This sounds like a very small issue to me, a revert is simply overkill.
>
> It all depends on your use case. To you, whom I assume doesn't use SELinux,
> it is indeed a trivial issue. To someone who relies on SELinux for its
> network access controls this is a pretty significant issue.
>
Is the patch I sent addressing the problem or not ?
Note that I do have : CONFIG_SECURITY=y
So this patch basically adds the overhead back, and I'll have to use
real hook later in net-next.
At least my patch clearly _shows_ the security requirement, instead of
relying on a side effect of a previous sock_wmalloc()
Again, it would be nice you understand the plan.
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe netdev" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Powered by blists - more mailing lists