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Message-Id: <20130408.171432.1360375865194610431.davem@davemloft.net>
Date: Mon, 08 Apr 2013 17:14:32 -0400 (EDT)
From: David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>
To: pmoore@...hat.com
Cc: eric.dumazet@...il.com, netdev@...r.kernel.org, mvadkert@...hat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH] tcp: assign the sock correctly to an outgoing SYNACK
packet
From: Paul Moore <pmoore@...hat.com>
Date: Mon, 08 Apr 2013 17:09:32 -0400
> On Monday, April 08, 2013 01:55:01 PM Eric Dumazet wrote:
>> At least my patch clearly _shows_ the security requirement, instead of
>> relying on a side effect of a previous sock_wmalloc()
>
> I don't see it as a side effect, and as far as demonstration, I think the
> SELinux network access controls in their entirety shows the security
> requirement. If we want to make the security requirements even more explicit
> in the networking stack, let's add a security blob to the sk_buff and allow
> some proper LSM hooks.
You don't get it.
Without LSM there is no need to use sock_wmalloc() or to have a socket
context attacked to the SYN/ACK packet at all.
Therefore, the need should be explicit (Eric's approach), rather than
implicit (what you seem to be after).
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