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Date:	Mon, 03 Jun 2013 10:51:34 -0500
From:	Rob Herring <robherring2@...il.com>
To:	Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@...il.com>
CC:	netdev@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: panics in tcp_ack

On 06/03/2013 08:25 AM, Eric Dumazet wrote:
> On Mon, 2013-06-03 at 08:05 -0500, Rob Herring wrote:
>> On 06/02/2013 09:23 PM, Rob Herring wrote:
>>> On 06/02/2013 07:36 PM, Eric Dumazet wrote:
>>>> On Sun, 2013-06-02 at 19:16 -0500, Rob Herring wrote:
>>>>> Sorry, this time with proper line wrapping...
>>>>>
>>>>> I'm debugging a kernel panic in the networking stack that happens with a
>>>>> cluster (20-40 nodes) of Calxeda highbank (ARM Cortex A9) nodes and
>>>>> typically only after 10-24 hours. The node are transferring files
>>>>> between nodes over TCP with 20 clients and servers per node. The kernel
>>>>> is based on ubuntu 3.5 kernel which is based on 3.5.7.11. So far testing
>>>>> has shown that 3.8.11 based (ubuntu raring) kernel is fixed. Attempts to
>>>>> bisect have not yielded results as it seems multiple problems mask the
>>>>> issue. Perhaps there is some new feature which has indirectly fixed the
>>>>> problem in 3.8.
>>>>>
>>>>> This commit appears to fix a similar panic and seems to reduce the
>>>>> frequency after picking it up in the latest 3.5 stable:
>>>>>
>>>>> commit 16fad69cfe4adbbfa813de516757b87bcae36d93
>>>>> Author: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>
>>>>> Date:   Thu Mar 14 05:40:32 2013 +0000
>>>>>
>>>>>     tcp: fix skb_availroom()
>>>>>         Chrome OS team reported a crash on a Pixel ChromeBook in TCP stack :
>>>>>         https://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=182056
>>>>>         commit a21d45726acac (tcp: avoid order-1 allocations on wifi and tx
>>>>>     path) did a poor choice adding an 'avail_size' field to skb, while
>>>>>     what we really needed was a 'reserved_tailroom' one.
>>>>>         It would have avoided commit 22b4a4f22da (tcp: fix retransmit of
>>>>>     partially acked frames) and this commit.
>>>>>         Crash occurs because skb_split() is not aware of the 'avail_size'
>>>>>     management (and should not be aware)
>>>>>         Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>
>>>>>     Reported-by: Mukesh Agrawal <quiche@...omium.org>
>>>>>     Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@...emloft.net>
>>>>>
>>>>> I've searched thru 3.8 and 3.9 stable fixes looking for possibly
>>>>> relevant commits and applied these commits not in 3.5 stable. However,
>>>>> they have not helped:
>>>>>
>>>>> net: drop dst before queueing fragments
>>>>> tcp: call tcp_replace_ts_recent() from tcp_ack()
>>>>> tcp: Reallocate headroom if it would overflow csum_start
>>>>> tcp: incoming connections might use wrong route under synflood
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> try also :
>>>>
>>>> commit 093162553c33e94 (tcp: force a dst refcount when prequeue packet)
>>>> commit 0d4f0608619de59 (tcp: dont handle MTU reduction on LISTEN socket)
>>>
>>> Will add and test.
>>>
>>>> commit 6731d2095bd4aef (tcp: fix for zero packets_in_flight was too
>>>> broad)
>>>> commit 2e5f421211ff76c (tcp: frto should not set snd_cwnd to 0)
>>>
>>> I have these 2.
>>
>> Ran overnight with the 2 additional patches. One panic after ~9 hours
>> running on 75 nodes.
>>
>> <4>[30632.185861] [<c04070f4>] (tcp_ack+0x79c/0x1014) from [<c0407cb4>]
>> (tcp_rcv_established+0x348/0x5e0)
>> <4>[30632.194903] [<c0407cb4>] (tcp_rcv_established+0x348/0x5e0) from
>> [<c040eda8>] (tcp_v4_do_rcv+0xf0/0x2cc)
>> <4>[30632.204291] [<c040eda8>] (tcp_v4_do_rcv+0xf0/0x2cc) from
>> [<c04111cc>] (tcp_v4_rcv+0x834/0x918)
>> <4>[30632.212900] [<c04111cc>] (tcp_v4_rcv+0x834/0x918) from
>> [<c03ef81c>] (ip_local_deliver_finish+0xe8/0x33c)
>> <4>[30632.222376] [<c03ef81c>] (ip_local_deliver_finish+0xe8/0x33c) from
>> [<c03ef3b4>] (ip_rcv_finish+0x140/0x4c0)
>> <4>[30632.232115] [<c03ef3b4>] (ip_rcv_finish+0x140/0x4c0) from
>> [<c03bf944>] (__netif_receive_skb+0x5e0/0x690)
>> <4>[30632.241590] [<c03bf944>] (__netif_receive_skb+0x5e0/0x690) from
>> [<c03c06e8>] (netif_receive_skb+0x1c/0x90)
>> <4>[30632.251240] [<c03c06e8>] (netif_receive_skb+0x1c/0x90) from
>> [<c03c2fac>] (napi_skb_finish+0x54/0x78)
>> <4>[30632.260371] [<c03c2fac>] (napi_skb_finish+0x54/0x78) from
>> [<c03301e4>] (xgmac_poll+0x3ac/0x4ec)
>> <4>[30632.269066] [<c03301e4>] (xgmac_poll+0x3ac/0x4ec) from
>> [<c03c2758>] (net_rx_action+0x140/0x228)
>> <4>[30632.277761] [<c03c2758>] (net_rx_action+0x140/0x228) from
>> [<c002ac94>] (__do_softirq+0xb4/0x1cc)
>> <4>[30632.286541] [<c002ac94>] (__do_softirq+0xb4/0x1cc) from
>> [<c002b18c>] (irq_exit+0x80/0x88)
>> <4>[30632.294716] [<c002b18c>] (irq_exit+0x80/0x88) from [<c000ea7c>]
>> (handle_IRQ+0x50/0xb0)
>> <4>[30632.302629] [<c000ea7c>] (handle_IRQ+0x50/0xb0) from [<c00084d4>]
>> (gic_handle_irq+0x24/0x58)
>> <4>[30632.311062] [<c00084d4>] (gic_handle_irq+0x24/0x58) from
>> [<c049e100>] (__irq_svc+0x40/0x50)
>> <4>[30632.319402] Exception stack(0xeca4dc10 to 0xeca4dc58)
>> <4>[30632.324445] dc00:                                     c2f7a580
>> 02000020 02000000 00000000
>> <4>[30632.332615] dc20: c2f7a580 e9e4f33c e9e4f34c 00000000 ec185300
>> 00001000 00000000 00001000
>> <4>[30632.340783] dc40: 00000001 eca4dc58 c0136cbc c0136cd4 200f0013
>> ffffffff
>> <4>[30632.347398] [<c049e100>] (__irq_svc+0x40/0x50) from [<c0136cd4>]
>> (__set_page_dirty+0x80/0xc0)
>> <4>[30632.355919] [<c0136cd4>] (__set_page_dirty+0x80/0xc0) from
>> [<c01387ac>] (__block_commit_write+0xb4/0xe0)
>> <4>[30632.365394] [<c01387ac>] (__block_commit_write+0xb4/0xe0) from
>> [<c0138eb4>] (block_write_end+0x4c/0x84)
>> <4>[30632.374782] [<c0138eb4>] (block_write_end+0x4c/0x84) from
>> [<c0138f20>] (generic_write_end+0x34/0xb0)
>> <4>[30632.383911] [<c0138f20>] (generic_write_end+0x34/0xb0) from
>> [<c01a0b8c>] (ext4_da_write_end+0xa4/0x340)
>> <4>[30632.393303] [<c01a0b8c>] (ext4_da_write_end+0xa4/0x340) from
>> [<c00ca2bc>] (generic_file_buffered_write+0xe0/0x25
>> 8)
>> <4>[30632.403648] [<c00ca2bc>] (generic_file_buffered_write+0xe0/0x258)
>> from [<c00cb1d8>] (__generic_file_aio_write+0x
>> 274/0x4bc)
>> <4>[30632.414684] [<c00cb1d8>] (__generic_file_aio_write+0x274/0x4bc)
>> from [<c00cb47c>] (generic_file_aio_write+0x5c/0
>> xc8)
>> <4>[30632.425201] [<c00cb47c>] (generic_file_aio_write+0x5c/0xc8) from
>> [<c019810c>] (ext4_file_write+0xcc/0x2a0)
>> <4>[30632.434853] [<c019810c>] (ext4_file_write+0xcc/0x2a0) from
>> [<c010a950>] (do_sync_write+0xa8/0xe8)
>> <4>[30632.443722] [<c010a950>] (do_sync_write+0xa8/0xe8) from
>> [<c010b360>] (vfs_write+0x9c/0x170)
>> <4>[30632.452069] [<c010b360>] (vfs_write+0x9c/0x170) from [<c010b648>]
>> (sys_write+0x38/0x70)
>> <4>[30632.460068] [<c010b648>] (sys_write+0x38/0x70) from [<c000db60>]
>> (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x30)
>>
>> The full stack looks like this:
>>
>> include/linux/skbuff.h:__skb_unlink
>> include/net/tcp.h:tcp_unlink_write_queue
>> net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:tcp_clean_rtx_queue
>> net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:tcp_ack
>>
>> This panic is in __skb_unlink with the skb prev ptr being NULL. Here's
>> the disassembly:
>>
>>                 if (!fully_acked)
>> c04070cc:       e3520000        cmp     r2, #0
>> c04070d0:       0afffecb        beq     c0406c04 <tcp_ack+0x2ac>
>> extern void        skb_unlink(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sk_buff_head
>> *list);
>> static inline void __skb_unlink(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sk_buff_head
>> *list)
>> {
>>         struct sk_buff *next, *prev;
>>
>>         list->qlen--;
>> c04070d4:       e59430a8        ldr     r3, [r4, #168]  ; 0xa8
>> static inline void sk_wmem_free_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
>> {
>>         sock_set_flag(sk, SOCK_QUEUE_SHRUNK);
>>         sk->sk_wmem_queued -= skb->truesize;
>>         sk_mem_uncharge(sk, skb->truesize);
>>         __kfree_skb(skb);
>> c04070d8:       e1a00005        mov     r0, r5
>> c04070dc:       e2433001        sub     r3, r3, #1
>> c04070e0:       e58430a8        str     r3, [r4, #168]  ; 0xa8
>>         next       = skb->next;
>>         prev       = skb->prev;
>> c04070e4:       e895000c        ldm     r5, {r2, r3}
>>         skb->next  = skb->prev = NULL;
>> c04070e8:       e5859000        str     r9, [r5]
>> c04070ec:       e5859004        str     r9, [r5, #4]
>>         next->prev = prev;
>> c04070f0:       e5823004        str     r3, [r2, #4]
>>         prev->next = next;
>> c04070f4:       e5832000        str     r2, [r3]
>>
>> Rob
> 
> 
> This looks like random memory scribbling of NULL pointers to me.
> 
> I have never seen such a pattern. (I admit I do not use ARM machines as
> much as you do :) )

Any ideas on what could cause that? Anything the driver could be doing
or not doing to cause it? Perhaps some memory ordering or visibility issue.

> Your best bet would be to perform a (reverse) bisection if you know
> recent kernels are OK.

I did that once looking at 3.6 and 3.7 stable kernels, but they did not
have fixes like "tcp: fix skb_availroom()" and so I just hit other
failures. I'll do it again with more fixes applied.

Rob

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