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Date:	Thu, 06 Jun 2013 10:39:52 -0400
From:	Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@...il.com>
To:	Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@...hat.com>
CC:	davem@...emloft.net, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-sctp@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH net v2] net: sctp: fix NULL pointer dereference in socket
 destruction

On 06/06/2013 09:53 AM, Daniel Borkmann wrote:
> While stress testing sctp sockets, I hit the following panic:
>
> BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000020
> IP: [<ffffffffa0490c4e>] sctp_endpoint_free+0xe/0x40 [sctp]
> PGD 7cead067 PUD 7ce76067 PMD 0
> Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
> Modules linked in: sctp(F) libcrc32c(F) [...]
> CPU: 7 PID: 2950 Comm: acc Tainted: GF            3.10.0-rc2+ #1
> Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge T410/0H19HD, BIOS 1.6.3 02/01/2011
> task: ffff88007ce0e0c0 ti: ffff88007b568000 task.ti: ffff88007b568000
> RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa0490c4e>]  [<ffffffffa0490c4e>] sctp_endpoint_free+0xe/0x40 [sctp]
> RSP: 0018:ffff88007b569e08  EFLAGS: 00010292
> RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88007db78a00 RCX: dead000000200200
> RDX: ffffffffa049fdb0 RSI: ffff8800379baf38 RDI: 0000000000000000
> RBP: ffff88007b569e18 R08: ffff88007c230da0 R09: 0000000000000001
> R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
> R13: ffff880077990d00 R14: 0000000000000084 R15: ffff88007db78a00
> FS:  00007fc18ab61700(0000) GS:ffff88007fc60000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
> CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
> CR2: 0000000000000020 CR3: 000000007cf9d000 CR4: 00000000000007e0
> DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
> DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
> Stack:
>   ffff88007b569e38 ffff88007db78a00 ffff88007b569e38 ffffffffa049fded
>   ffffffff81abf0c0 ffff88007db78a00 ffff88007b569e58 ffffffff8145b60e
>   0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffff88007b569eb8 ffffffff814df36e
> Call Trace:
>   [<ffffffffa049fded>] sctp_destroy_sock+0x3d/0x80 [sctp]
>   [<ffffffff8145b60e>] sk_common_release+0x1e/0xf0
>   [<ffffffff814df36e>] inet_create+0x2ae/0x350
>   [<ffffffff81455a6f>] __sock_create+0x11f/0x240
>   [<ffffffff81455bf0>] sock_create+0x30/0x40
>   [<ffffffff8145696c>] SyS_socket+0x4c/0xc0
>   [<ffffffff815403be>] ? do_page_fault+0xe/0x10
>   [<ffffffff8153cb32>] ? page_fault+0x22/0x30
>   [<ffffffff81544e02>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
> Code: 0c c9 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 e8 fb fe ff ff c9 c3 66 0f
>        1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 55 48 89 e5 53 48 83 ec 08 66 66 66 66 90 <48>
>        8b 47 20 48 89 fb c6 47 1c 01 c6 40 12 07 e8 9e 68 01 00 48
> RIP  [<ffffffffa0490c4e>] sctp_endpoint_free+0xe/0x40 [sctp]
>   RSP <ffff88007b569e08>
> CR2: 0000000000000020
> ---[ end trace e0d71ec1108c1dd9 ]---
>
> I did not hit this with the lksctp-tools functional tests, but with a
> small, multi-threaded test program, that heavily allocates, binds,
> listens and waits in accept on sctp sockets, and then randomly kills
> some of them (no need for an actual client in this case to hit this).
> Then, again, allocating, binding, etc, and then killing child processes.
>
> This panic then only occurs when ``echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/sctp/auth_enable''
> is set. The cause for that is actually very simple: in sctp_endpoint_init()
> we enter the path of sctp_auth_init_hmacs(). There, we try to allocate
> our crypto transforms through crypto_alloc_hash(). In our scenario,
> it then can happen that crypto_alloc_hash() fails with -EINTR from
> crypto_larval_wait(), thus we bail out and release the socket via
> sk_common_release(), sctp_destroy_sock() and hit the NULL pointer
> dereference as soon as we try to access members in the endpoint during
> sctp_endpoint_free(), since endpoint at that time is still NULL. Now,
> if we have that case, we do not need to do any cleanup work and just
> leave the destruction handler.
>
> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@...hat.com>

Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@...il.com>

should be queued for stable as well.

-vlad

> ---
>   net/sctp/socket.c | 6 ++++++
>   1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/net/sctp/socket.c b/net/sctp/socket.c
> index f631c5f..3df7327 100644
> --- a/net/sctp/socket.c
> +++ b/net/sctp/socket.c
> @@ -4003,6 +4003,12 @@ SCTP_STATIC void sctp_destroy_sock(struct sock *sk)
>
>   	/* Release our hold on the endpoint. */
>   	sp = sctp_sk(sk);
> +	/* This could happen during socket init, thus we bail out
> +	 * early, since the rest of the below is not setup either.
> +	 */
> +	if (sp->ep == NULL)
> +		return;
> +
>   	if (sp->do_auto_asconf) {
>   		sp->do_auto_asconf = 0;
>   		list_del(&sp->auto_asconf_list);
>

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