netdev - Re: [PATCH 1/3 v4] ipv6: do not disable temp_address when reaching max

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Message-ID: <520C3A13.3060106@huawei.com>
Date:	Thu, 15 Aug 2013 10:16:51 +0800
From:	Ding Tianhong <dingtianhong@...wei.com>
To:	"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
	Alexey Kuznetsov <kuznet@....inr.ac.ru>,
	James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
	Hideaki YOSHIFUJI <yoshfuji@...ux-ipv6.org>,
	Patrick McHardy <kaber@...sh.net>,
	Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@...csson.com>,
	Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>,
	Netdev <netdev@...r.kernel.org>, <kargig@...d.gr>,
	<ppandit@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/3 v4] ipv6: do not disable temp_address when reaching
 max_address

On 2013/8/15 9:24, Hannes Frederic Sowa wrote:
> On Thu, Aug 15, 2013 at 08:43:06AM +0800, Ding Tianhong wrote:
>> On 2013/8/14 18:15, Hannes Frederic Sowa wrote:
>>> On Wed, Aug 14, 2013 at 05:06:54PM +0800, Ding Tianhong wrote:
>>>> A LAN user can remotely disable temporary address which may lead
>>>> to privacy violatins and information disclosure.
>>>>
>>>> The reason is that the linux kernel uses the 'ipv6.max_addresses'
>>>> option to specify how many ipv6 addresses and interface may have.
>>>> The 'ipv6.regen_max_retry' (default value 3) option specifies
>>>> how many times the kernel will try to create a new address.
>>>>
>>>> But the kernel is not distinguish between the event of reaching
>>>> max_addresses for an interface and failing to generate a new address.
>>>> the kernel disable the temporary address after regenerate a new
>>>> address 'regen_max_retry' times.
>>>>
>>>> According RFC4941 3.3.7:
>>>>
>>>> ---------------------------------------
>>>>
>>>> If DAD indicates the address is already in use,
>>>> the node must generate a new randomized interface
>>>> identifier as described in section 3.2 above, and
>>>> repeat the previous steps as appropriate up to
>>>> TEMP_IDGEN_RETRIES times.
>>>>
>>>> If after TEMP_IDGEN_RETRIES consecutive attempts no
>>>> non-unique address was generated, the node must log
>>>> a system error and must not attempt to generate
>>>> temporary address for that interface.
>>>>
>>>> ------------------------------------------
>>>>
>>>> RFC4941 3.3.7 specifies that disabling the temp_address must happen
>>>> upon the address is already in use, not reach the max_address,
>>>> So we have to check the return err and distinguish the correct retry path.
>>>>
>>>> This fixes CVE-2013-0343
>>>
>>> I don't think this patch fixes CVE-2013-0343.
>>>
>>>>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Ding Tianhong <dingtianhong@...wei.com>
>>>> Tested-by: Wang Weidong <wangweidong1@...wei.com>
>>>> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@...emloft.net>
>>>> Cc: Sergei Shtylyov <sergei.shtylyov@...entembedded.com>
>>>> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>
>>>> ---
>>>>  net/ipv6/addrconf.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++----
>>>>  1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>>>>
>>>> diff --git a/net/ipv6/addrconf.c b/net/ipv6/addrconf.c
>>>> index da4241c..7b55464 100644
>>>> --- a/net/ipv6/addrconf.c
>>>> +++ b/net/ipv6/addrconf.c
>>>> @@ -1134,10 +1134,28 @@ retry:
>>>>  	if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(ift)) {
>>>>  		in6_ifa_put(ifp);
>>>>  		in6_dev_put(idev);
>>>> -		pr_info("%s: retry temporary address regeneration\n", __func__);
>>>> -		tmpaddr = &addr;
>>>> -		write_lock(&idev->lock);
>>>> -		goto retry;
>>>> +
>>>> +		/* According RFC4941 3.3.7:
>>>> +		 * If DAD indicates the address is already in use,
>>>> +		 * the node must generate a new randomized interface
>>>> +		 * identifier as described in section 3.2 above, and
>>>> +		 * repeat the previous steps as appropriate up to
>>>> +		 * TEMP_IDGEN_RETRIES times.
>>>> +		 * If after TEMP_IDGEN_RETRIES consecutive attempts no
>>>> +		 * non-unique address was generated, the node must log
>>>> +		 * a system error and must not attempt to generate
>>>> +		 * temporary address for that interface.
>>>> +		 * So we have to check the return err and distinguish
>>>> +		 * the correct retry path.
>>>> +		 */
>>>> +		if (PTR_ERR(ift) == -EEXIST) {
>>>
>>> -EEXIST is not the same as "ipv6 address is is already used on the
>>> subnet". I really don't see the point here. IMHO this breaks the intended
>>> regeneration logic.
>>>
>>> I fear a fix of CVE-2013-0343 will be a bit more complicated. ;) I give it a
>>> thought.
>>>
>>> Greetings,
>>>
>>>   Hannes
>>>
>>>
>> ok, thanks for your feedback, I'll waiting you for more information to fix the problem.:)
> 
> [added George Kargiotakis and P J P to Cc and full quote]
> 
> I wonder if the easiest solution would be to just drop the max_addresses
> limit from ipv6_create_tempaddr. max_addresses protects the kernel from
> installing an unlimited amount of addresses on an interface which gets flooded
> by RAs. Because we have a direct relation between interface address to temp
> address, I don't see that we would create the possiblity of DoS.
> 
> Sure, an audit and testing is needed.
> 
> Greetings,
> 
>   Hannes
> 

I am afraid that if remove the max limit from the ipv6_create_tempaddr, the tool flood_route26 attack will create huge address to the temp_list, it will be a huge list,
may it destroy something or not?

Best regards
Ding Tianhong

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> .
> 


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