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Message-ID: <5226F839.4010704@redhat.com>
Date:	Wed, 04 Sep 2013 11:07:05 +0200
From:	Jan Kaluža <jkaluza@...hat.com>
To:	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
CC:	davem@...emloft.net, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	netdev@...r.kernel.org, eparis@...hat.com, rgb@...hat.com,
	tj@...nel.org, lizefan@...wei.com,
	containers@...ts.linux-foundation.org, cgroups@...r.kernel.org,
	viro@...iv.linux.org.uk
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 1/3] Send loginuid and sessionid in SCM_AUDIT

On 09/04/2013 09:22 AM, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> Jan Kaluza <jkaluza@...hat.com> writes:
>
>> Server-like processes in many cases need credentials and other
>> metadata of the peer, to decide if the calling process is allowed to
>> request a specific action, or the server just wants to log away this
>> type of information for auditing tasks.
>>
>> The current practice to retrieve such process metadata is to look that
>> information up in procfs with the $PID received over SCM_CREDENTIALS.
>> This is sufficient for long-running tasks, but introduces a race which
>> cannot be worked around for short-living processes; the calling
>> process and all the information in /proc/$PID/ is gone before the
>> receiver of the socket message can look it up.
>>
>> This introduces a new SCM type called SCM_AUDIT to allow the direct
>> attaching of "loginuid" and "sessionid" to SCM, which is significantly more
>> efficient and will reliably avoid the race with the round-trip over
>> procfs.
>
> Unless I am misreading something this patch will break the build if
> CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL is not defined.

It does build. In this case, audit_get_loginuid returns INVALID_UID and 
audit_get_sessionid returns -1.

Jan Kaluza

> Eric
>
>
>> Signed-off-by: Jan Kaluza <jkaluza@...hat.com>
>> ---
>>   include/linux/socket.h |  6 ++++++
>>   include/net/af_unix.h  |  2 ++
>>   include/net/scm.h      | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
>>   net/unix/af_unix.c     |  7 +++++++
>>   4 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/include/linux/socket.h b/include/linux/socket.h
>> index 445ef75..505047a 100644
>> --- a/include/linux/socket.h
>> +++ b/include/linux/socket.h
>> @@ -130,6 +130,7 @@ static inline struct cmsghdr * cmsg_nxthdr (struct msghdr *__msg, struct cmsghdr
>>   #define	SCM_RIGHTS	0x01		/* rw: access rights (array of int) */
>>   #define SCM_CREDENTIALS 0x02		/* rw: struct ucred		*/
>>   #define SCM_SECURITY	0x03		/* rw: security label		*/
>> +#define SCM_AUDIT	0x04		/* rw: struct uaudit		*/
>>
>>   struct ucred {
>>   	__u32	pid;
>> @@ -137,6 +138,11 @@ struct ucred {
>>   	__u32	gid;
>>   };
>>
>> +struct uaudit {
>> +	__u32	loginuid;
>> +	__u32	sessionid;
>> +};
>> +
>>   /* Supported address families. */
>>   #define AF_UNSPEC	0
>>   #define AF_UNIX		1	/* Unix domain sockets 		*/
>> diff --git a/include/net/af_unix.h b/include/net/af_unix.h
>> index a175ba4..3b9d22a 100644
>> --- a/include/net/af_unix.h
>> +++ b/include/net/af_unix.h
>> @@ -36,6 +36,8 @@ struct unix_skb_parms {
>>   	u32			secid;		/* Security ID		*/
>>   #endif
>>   	u32			consumed;
>> +	kuid_t			loginuid;
>> +	unsigned int		sessionid;
>>   };
>>
>>   #define UNIXCB(skb) 	(*(struct unix_skb_parms *)&((skb)->cb))
>> diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
>> index 8de2d37..e349a25 100644
>> --- a/include/net/scm.h
>> +++ b/include/net/scm.h
>> @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
>>   #include <linux/security.h>
>>   #include <linux/pid.h>
>>   #include <linux/nsproxy.h>
>> +#include <linux/audit.h>
>>
>>   /* Well, we should have at least one descriptor open
>>    * to accept passed FDs 8)
>> @@ -18,6 +19,11 @@ struct scm_creds {
>>   	kgid_t	gid;
>>   };
>>
>> +struct scm_audit {
>> +	kuid_t loginuid;
>> +	unsigned int sessionid;
>> +};
>> +
>>   struct scm_fp_list {
>>   	short			count;
>>   	short			max;
>> @@ -28,6 +34,7 @@ struct scm_cookie {
>>   	struct pid		*pid;		/* Skb credentials */
>>   	struct scm_fp_list	*fp;		/* Passed files		*/
>>   	struct scm_creds	creds;		/* Skb credentials	*/
>> +	struct scm_audit	audit;		/* Skb audit	*/
>>   #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
>>   	u32			secid;		/* Passed security ID 	*/
>>   #endif
>> @@ -58,6 +65,13 @@ static __inline__ void scm_set_cred(struct scm_cookie *scm,
>>   	scm->creds.gid = gid;
>>   }
>>
>> +static inline void scm_set_audit(struct scm_cookie *scm,
>> +				    kuid_t loginuid, unsigned int sessionid)
>> +{
>> +	scm->audit.loginuid = loginuid;
>> +	scm->audit.sessionid = sessionid;
>> +}
>> +
>>   static __inline__ void scm_destroy_cred(struct scm_cookie *scm)
>>   {
>>   	put_pid(scm->pid);
>> @@ -77,8 +91,12 @@ static __inline__ int scm_send(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
>>   	memset(scm, 0, sizeof(*scm));
>>   	scm->creds.uid = INVALID_UID;
>>   	scm->creds.gid = INVALID_GID;
>> -	if (forcecreds)
>> -		scm_set_cred(scm, task_tgid(current), current_uid(), current_gid());
>> +	if (forcecreds) {
>> +		scm_set_cred(scm, task_tgid(current), current_uid(),
>> +			     current_gid());
>> +		scm_set_audit(scm, audit_get_loginuid(current),
>> +			      audit_get_sessionid(current));
>> +	}
>>   	unix_get_peersec_dgram(sock, scm);
>>   	if (msg->msg_controllen <= 0)
>>   		return 0;
>> @@ -123,7 +141,13 @@ static __inline__ void scm_recv(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
>>   			.uid = from_kuid_munged(current_ns, scm->creds.uid),
>>   			.gid = from_kgid_munged(current_ns, scm->creds.gid),
>>   		};
>> +		struct uaudit uaudits = {
>> +			.loginuid = from_kuid_munged(current_ns,
>> +						     scm->audit.loginuid),
>> +			.sessionid = scm->audit.sessionid,
>> +		};
>>   		put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_CREDENTIALS, sizeof(ucreds), &ucreds);
>> +		put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_AUDIT, sizeof(uaudits), &uaudits);
>>   	}
>>
>>   	scm_destroy_cred(scm);
>> diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
>> index 86de99a..c410f76 100644
>> --- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
>> +++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
>> @@ -1393,6 +1393,8 @@ static int unix_scm_to_skb(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb, bool sen
>>   	UNIXCB(skb).pid  = get_pid(scm->pid);
>>   	UNIXCB(skb).uid = scm->creds.uid;
>>   	UNIXCB(skb).gid = scm->creds.gid;
>> +	UNIXCB(skb).loginuid = scm->audit.loginuid;
>> +	UNIXCB(skb).sessionid = scm->audit.sessionid;
>>   	UNIXCB(skb).fp = NULL;
>>   	if (scm->fp && send_fds)
>>   		err = unix_attach_fds(scm, skb);
>> @@ -1416,6 +1418,8 @@ static void maybe_add_creds(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct socket *sock,
>>   	    test_bit(SOCK_PASSCRED, &other->sk_socket->flags)) {
>>   		UNIXCB(skb).pid  = get_pid(task_tgid(current));
>>   		current_uid_gid(&UNIXCB(skb).uid, &UNIXCB(skb).gid);
>> +		UNIXCB(skb).loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
>> +		UNIXCB(skb).sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
>>   	}
>>   }
>>
>> @@ -1812,6 +1816,7 @@ static int unix_dgram_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
>>   		memset(&tmp_scm, 0, sizeof(tmp_scm));
>>   	}
>>   	scm_set_cred(siocb->scm, UNIXCB(skb).pid, UNIXCB(skb).uid, UNIXCB(skb).gid);
>> +	scm_set_audit(siocb->scm, UNIXCB(skb).loginuid, UNIXCB(skb).sessionid);
>>   	unix_set_secdata(siocb->scm, skb);
>>
>>   	if (!(flags & MSG_PEEK)) {
>> @@ -1993,6 +1998,8 @@ again:
>>   		} else if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSCRED, &sock->flags)) {
>>   			/* Copy credentials */
>>   			scm_set_cred(siocb->scm, UNIXCB(skb).pid, UNIXCB(skb).uid, UNIXCB(skb).gid);
>> +			scm_set_audit(siocb->scm, UNIXCB(skb).loginuid,
>> +				      UNIXCB(skb).sessionid);
>>   			check_creds = 1;
>>   		}

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