netdev - Re: [PATCH 1/2] net: Toeplitz library functions

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Date:	Tue, 24 Sep 2013 09:10:15 -0700
From:	Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@...il.com>
To:	Tom Herbert <therbert@...gle.com>
Cc:	David Miller <davem@...hat.com>,
	David Laight <David.Laight@...lab.com>,
	Linux Netdev List <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
	"Brandeburg, Jesse" <jesse.brandeburg@...el.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] net: Toeplitz library functions

On Tue, 2013-09-24 at 08:54 -0700, Tom Herbert wrote:

> The Toeplitz function uses a secret key whose length is based on the
> input length.  96 bits in IPv4, 320 bits in IPv6.  I don't see how an
> attacker can reproduce this if the key is random.  If the problem is
> that devices are not being configured with a sufficiently random key
> (some actually are using a fixed key :-( ), that's a separate issue
> that should be addressed.  It is possible to DoS attack through the
> steering mechanism.

Well, your patch would make sense [1] only if we could use hardware
assistance, but right now we have no idea of how safe are the existing
assistances.

[1] Computing Toeplitz in software is way more expensive than jhash.

Dos attack is quite simple right now, even without knowing if the target
uses or not steering.



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