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Message-ID: <CA+mtBx9=wp5T4HxZHVPU4if-BxPaU6Mb+u9PFP6vXicoaosg1A@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 24 Sep 2013 11:06:55 -0700
From: Tom Herbert <therbert@...gle.com>
To: David Miller <davem@...hat.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@...lab.com>,
Linux Netdev List <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
"Brandeburg, Jesse" <jesse.brandeburg@...el.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] net: Toeplitz library functions
On Tue, Sep 24, 2013 at 11:03 AM, David Miller <davem@...hat.com> wrote:
> From: Tom Herbert <therbert@...gle.com>
> Date: Tue, 24 Sep 2013 08:54:24 -0700
>
>> On Tue, Sep 24, 2013 at 8:39 AM, David Miller <davem@...hat.com> wrote:
>>> From: Tom Herbert <therbert@...gle.com>
>>> Date: Tue, 24 Sep 2013 08:22:55 -0700
>>>
>>>> We use this value for steering, and could use it for other uses like
>>>> connection lookup.
>>>
>>> For security reasons we absolutely cannot use it for that purpose,
>>> please stop claiming this.
>>>
>>> Any hash function which an attacker can reproduce is attackable.
>>
>> The Toeplitz function uses a secret key whose length is based on the
>> input length. 96 bits in IPv4, 320 bits in IPv6. I don't see how an
>> attacker can reproduce this if the key is random. If the problem is
>> that devices are not being configured with a sufficiently random key
>> (some actually are using a fixed key :-( ), that's a separate issue
>> that should be addressed. It is possible to DoS attack through the
>> steering mechanism.
>
> All of them are using a fixed, defined, key.
bnx2x, at least, seems to being trying to set a random key:
prandom_bytes(params.rss_key, T_ETH_RSS_KEY * 4);
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