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Message-ID: <20130925090034.GC4904@order.stressinduktion.org>
Date: Wed, 25 Sep 2013 11:00:34 +0200
From: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@...essinduktion.org>
To: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@...il.com>
Cc: Tom Herbert <therbert@...gle.com>, davem@...emloft.net,
netdev@...r.kernel.org, jesse.brandeburg@...el.com, tytso@....edu,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH RFC] random: introduce get_random_bytes_busy_wait_initialized
On Tue, Sep 24, 2013 at 06:19:57AM -0700, Eric Dumazet wrote:
> From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>
>
> A host might need net_secret[] and never open a single socket.
>
> Problem added in commit aebda156a570782
> ("net: defer net_secret[] initialization")
>
> Based on prior patch from Hannes Frederic Sowa.
>
> Reported-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@...essinduktion.org>
> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>
Perhaps we can even do a bit better? This patch is a RFC and I could split the
random and network parts if needed.
[PATCH RFC] random: introduce get_random_bytes_busy_wait_initialized
We want to use good entropy for initializing the secret keys used for
hashing in the core network stack. So busy wait before extracting random
data until the nonblocking_pool is initialized.
Further entropy is also gathered by interrupts, so we are guaranteed to
make progress here.
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@...il.com>
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@....edu>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@...essinduktion.org>
---
drivers/char/random.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
include/linux/random.h | 1 +
net/core/secure_seq.c | 3 ++-
net/ipv4/af_inet.c | 2 +-
4 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index 7737b5b..50e8030 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -1058,6 +1058,24 @@ void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes)
EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes);
/*
+ * Busy loop until the nonblocking_pool is intialized and return
+ * random data in buf of size nbytes.
+ *
+ * This is used by the network stack to defer the extraction of
+ * entropy from the nonblocking_pool until the pool is initialized.
+ *
+ * We need to busy loop here, because we could be called from an
+ * atomic section.
+ */
+void get_random_bytes_busy_wait_initialized(void *buf, int nbytes)
+{
+ while (!nonblocking_pool.initialized)
+ cpu_relax();
+ get_random_bytes(buf, nbytes);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes_busy_wait_initialized);
+
+/*
* This function will use the architecture-specific hardware random
* number generator if it is available. The arch-specific hw RNG will
* almost certainly be faster than what we can do in software, but it
diff --git a/include/linux/random.h b/include/linux/random.h
index 3b9377d..0b7e7dd 100644
--- a/include/linux/random.h
+++ b/include/linux/random.h
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ extern void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
extern void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, int irq_flags);
extern void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes);
+void get_random_bytes_busy_wait_initialized(void *buf, int nbbytes);
extern void get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, int nbytes);
void generate_random_uuid(unsigned char uuid_out[16]);
diff --git a/net/core/secure_seq.c b/net/core/secure_seq.c
index 3f1ec15..ac55cb7 100644
--- a/net/core/secure_seq.c
+++ b/net/core/secure_seq.c
@@ -24,7 +24,8 @@ static void net_secret_init(void)
for (i = NET_SECRET_SIZE; i > 0;) {
do {
- get_random_bytes(&tmp, sizeof(tmp));
+ get_random_bytes_busy_wait_initialized(&tmp,
+ sizeof(tmp));
} while (!tmp);
cmpxchg(&net_secret[--i], 0, tmp);
}
diff --git a/net/ipv4/af_inet.c b/net/ipv4/af_inet.c
index cfeb85c..3edd277 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/af_inet.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/af_inet.c
@@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ void build_ehash_secret(void)
u32 rnd;
do {
- get_random_bytes(&rnd, sizeof(rnd));
+ get_random_bytes_busy_wait_initialized(&rnd, sizeof(rnd));
} while (rnd == 0);
if (cmpxchg(&inet_ehash_secret, 0, rnd) == 0)
--
1.8.3.1
--
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