lists.openwall.net   lists  /  announce  owl-users  owl-dev  john-users  john-dev  passwdqc-users  yescrypt  popa3d-users  /  oss-security  kernel-hardening  musl  sabotage  tlsify  passwords  /  crypt-dev  xvendor  /  Bugtraq  Full-Disclosure  linux-kernel  linux-netdev  linux-ext4  linux-hardening  linux-cve-announce  PHC 
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
 
Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.
[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <52AB506E.3040509@citrix.com>
Date:	Fri, 13 Dec 2013 18:22:38 +0000
From:	Zoltan Kiss <zoltan.kiss@...rix.com>
To:	Wei Liu <wei.liu2@...rix.com>
CC:	<ian.campbell@...rix.com>, <xen-devel@...ts.xenproject.org>,
	<netdev@...r.kernel.org>, <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	<jonathan.davies@...rix.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH net-next v2 1/9] xen-netback: Introduce TX grant map definitions

On 13/12/13 15:31, Wei Liu wrote:
> On Thu, Dec 12, 2013 at 11:48:09PM +0000, Zoltan Kiss wrote:
>> This patch contains the new definitions necessary for grant mapping.
>>
>> v2:
>> - move unmapping to separate thread. The NAPI instance has to be scheduled
>>    even from thread context, which can cause huge delays
>> - that causes unfortunately bigger struct xenvif
>> - store grant handle after checking validity
>>
>
> If the size of xenvif really becomes a problem, you can try to make
> sratch space like struct gnttab_copy per-cpu. The downside is that
> approach requires much coding and carefully guard against race
> conditions. You would need to consider cost v.s. benefit.

I mentioned this because for the first series I had comments that I 
should be more vigilant about this. At that time there was a problem 
with struct xenvif allocation which was solved by now. My quick 
calculation showed this patch will increase the size with ~15kb

>
>> Signed-off-by: Zoltan Kiss <zoltan.kiss@...rix.com>
>>
>> ---
> [...]
>>   #define XENVIF_QUEUE_LENGTH 32
>>   #define XENVIF_NAPI_WEIGHT  64
>> diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c b/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c
>> index c1b7a42..3ddc474 100644
>> --- a/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c
>> +++ b/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c
>> @@ -772,6 +772,20 @@ static struct page *xenvif_alloc_page(struct xenvif *vif,
>>   	return page;
>>   }
>>
>> +static inline void xenvif_tx_create_gop(struct xenvif *vif, u16 pending_idx,
>> +	       struct xen_netif_tx_request *txp,
>> +	       struct gnttab_map_grant_ref *gop)
>> +{
>> +	vif->pages_to_map[gop-vif->tx_map_ops] = vif->mmap_pages[pending_idx];
>> +	gnttab_set_map_op(gop, idx_to_kaddr(vif, pending_idx),
>> +			  GNTMAP_host_map | GNTMAP_readonly,
>> +			  txp->gref, vif->domid);
>> +
>> +	memcpy(&vif->pending_tx_info[pending_idx].req, txp,
>> +	       sizeof(*txp));
>> +
>> +}
>> +
>
> This helper function is not used until next patch. Probably you can move
> it to the second patch.
>
> The same applies to other helper functions as well. Move them to the
> patch they are used. It would be easier for people to review.
I just moved them here because the second patch is already huge, and I 
couldn't have an idea to splice it up while keeping it bisectable and 
logically consistent. As I mentioned, I welcome ideas about that.

>
>>   static struct gnttab_copy *xenvif_get_requests(struct xenvif *vif,
>>   					       struct sk_buff *skb,
>>   					       struct xen_netif_tx_request *txp,
>> @@ -1593,6 +1607,106 @@ static int xenvif_tx_submit(struct xenvif *vif)
>>   	return work_done;
>>   }
>>
>> +void xenvif_zerocopy_callback(struct ubuf_info *ubuf, bool zerocopy_success)
>> +{
>
> Do we care about zerocopy_success? I don't see it used in this function.
It will be used in the 5th patch. Anyway, it's in the definition of the 
zerocopy callback.

>
>> +	unsigned long flags;
>> +	pending_ring_idx_t index;
>> +	u16 pending_idx = ubuf->desc;
>> +	struct pending_tx_info *temp =
>> +		container_of(ubuf, struct pending_tx_info, callback_struct);
>> +	struct xenvif *vif =
>> +		container_of(temp - pending_idx, struct xenvif,
>> +			pending_tx_info[0]);
>> +
>
> The third parameter to container_of should be the name of the member
> within the struct.
Here we have the pending_idx, so we get a pointer for the holding struct 
pending_tx_info, then for the beginning of pending_tx_info (temp - 
pending_idx), and then to the struct xenvif. It's a bit tricky and not 
straightforward, I admit :)

>
>> +	spin_lock_irqsave(&vif->dealloc_lock, flags);
>> +	do {
>> +		pending_idx = ubuf->desc;
>> +		ubuf = (struct ubuf_info *) ubuf->ctx;
>> +		index = pending_index(vif->dealloc_prod);
>> +		vif->dealloc_ring[index] = pending_idx;
>> +		/* Sync with xenvif_tx_action_dealloc:
>> +		 * insert idx then incr producer.
>> +		 */
>> +		smp_wmb();
>> +		vif->dealloc_prod++;
>> +	} while (ubuf);
>> +	wake_up(&vif->dealloc_wq);
>> +	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&vif->dealloc_lock, flags);
>> +}
>> +
>> +static inline void xenvif_tx_dealloc_action(struct xenvif *vif)
>> +{
>> +	struct gnttab_unmap_grant_ref *gop;
>> +	pending_ring_idx_t dc, dp;
>> +	u16 pending_idx, pending_idx_release[MAX_PENDING_REQS];
>> +	unsigned int i = 0;
>> +
>> +	dc = vif->dealloc_cons;
>> +	gop = vif->tx_unmap_ops;
>> +
>> +	/* Free up any grants we have finished using */
>> +	do {
>> +		dp = vif->dealloc_prod;
>> +
>> +		/* Ensure we see all indices enqueued by netif_idx_release(). */
>
> There is no netif_idx_release in netback code. :-)
Oh yes, that's from the classic code, it should be 
xenvif_zerocopy_callback. I will fix it.

>
>> +		smp_rmb();
>> +
>> +		while (dc != dp) {
>> +			pending_idx =
>> +				vif->dealloc_ring[pending_index(dc++)];
>> +
>> +			/* Already unmapped? */
>> +			if (vif->grant_tx_handle[pending_idx] ==
>> +				NETBACK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
>> +				netdev_err(vif->dev,
>> +					"Trying to unmap invalid handle! "
>> +					"pending_idx: %x\n", pending_idx);
>> +				continue;
>> +			}
>
> Should this be BUG_ON? AIUI this kthread should be the only one doing
> unmap, right?
The NAPI instance can do it as well if it is a small packet fits into 
PKT_PROT_LEN. But still this scenario shouldn't really happen, I was 
just not sure we have to crash immediately. Maybe handle it as a fatal 
error and destroy the vif?


--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe netdev" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html

Powered by blists - more mailing lists

Powered by Openwall GNU/*/Linux Powered by OpenVZ