Message-ID: <20140416190657.GK31074@redhat.com>
Date:	Wed, 16 Apr 2014 15:06:57 -0400
From:	Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@...hat.com>
To:	Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
Cc:	Simo Sorce <ssorce@...hat.com>, David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>,
	Tejun Heo <tj@...nel.org>, Daniel Walsh <dwalsh@...hat.com>,
	"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	lpoetter@...hat.com, cgroups@...r.kernel.org, kay@...hat.com,
	Network Development <netdev@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] net: Implement SO_PASSCGROUP to enable passing
 cgroup path

On Wed, Apr 16, 2014 at 11:35:13AM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Wed, Apr 16, 2014 at 11:25 AM, Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@...hat.com> wrote:
> > On Wed, Apr 16, 2014 at 11:13:31AM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> >
> > [..]
> >> > Ok, so passing cgroup information is not necessarily a problem as long
> >> > as it is not used for authentication. So say somebody is just logging
> >> > all the client request and which cgroup client was in, that should not
> >> > be a problem.
> >>
> >> Do you consider correct attribution of logging messages to be
> >> important?  If so, then this is a kind of authentication, albeit one
> >> where the impact of screwing it up is a bit lower.
> >
> > So not passing cgroup information makes attribution more correct. Just
> > logging of information is authentication how? Both kernel and user space
> > log message into /var/log/messages and kernel messages are prefixed with
> > "kernel". So this somehow becomes are sort of authentication. I don't
> > get it.
> 
> I did a bad job of explaining what I meant.
> 
> I think that, currently, log lines can be correctly attributed to the
> kernel or to userspace, but determining where in userspace a log line
> came from is a bit flaky.  One of the goals of these patches is to
> make log attribution less flaky.  But if you want log attribution to
> be completely correct, even in the presence of malicious programs,
> then I think that the current patches aren't quite there.

Why do you think that current patches are not there yet in the presence of 
malicious program. In your example, one program opened the socket and
passed it to malicious program. And all the future messages are coming
from malicious program. As long as receiver checks for SO_PASSCGROUP, 
it covers your example.

How a malicious program will fake cgroup information?

And we want to take care of pid related races too.

> 
> Is the reason that you don't want to modify the senders because you
> want users of syslog(3) to get the new behavior?  If so, I think it
> would be nice to update glibc to fix that, but maybe the kernel should
> cooperate, and maybe SO_PEERCGROUP is a decent way to handle this.

Modifying every user of unix sockets to start passing cgroup information
will make sense only if it was deemed that passing cgroup information
is risky inherently and should be done only in selected cases.

I think so far our understanding is that we can't find anything 
inherently wrong with passing cgroup information, though there might
be some corner cases we can run into and which are not obivious right
now.

In this case, it does not make sense to force opt-in on clients. It
is more convinient to default to *opt-in* and implement *opt-out* when
need be.

> 
> I still think that SO_PASSCGROUP, as currently designed, is problematic.

And I still do not get why it is problematic.

Thanks
Vivek
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