[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <20140417185742.GB32527@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 17 Apr 2014 14:57:42 -0400
From: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@...hat.com>
To: Simo Sorce <ssorce@...hat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
Daniel J Walsh <dwalsh@...hat.com>,
David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>, Tejun Heo <tj@...nel.org>,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
lpoetter@...hat.com, cgroups@...r.kernel.org, kay@...hat.com,
Network Development <netdev@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] net: Implement SO_PASSCGROUP to enable passing
cgroup path
On Thu, Apr 17, 2014 at 02:50:23PM -0400, Vivek Goyal wrote:
> On Thu, Apr 17, 2014 at 02:23:33PM -0400, Simo Sorce wrote:
> > On Thu, 2014-04-17 at 10:35 -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> > > On Thu, Apr 17, 2014 at 10:33 AM, Simo Sorce <ssorce@...hat.com> wrote:
> > > > On Thu, 2014-04-17 at 10:26 -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> > > >>
> > > >> Not really. write(2) can't send SCM_CGROUP. Callers of sendmsg(2)
> > > >> who supply SCM_CGROUP are explicitly indicating that they want their
> > > >> cgroup associated with that message. Callers of write(2) and send(2)
> > > >> are simply indicating that they have some bytes that they want to
> > > >> shove into whatever's at the other end of the fd.
> > > >
> > > > But there is no attack vector that passes by tricking setuid binaries to
> > > > write to pre-opened file descriptors on sendmsg(), and for the other
> > > > cases (connected socket) journald can always cross check with
> > > > SO_PEERCGROUP, so why do we care again ?
> > >
> > > Because the proposed code does not do what I described, at least as
> > > far I as I can tell.
> >
> > Ok let me backtrack, apparently if you explicitly use connect() on a
> > datagram socket then you *can* write() (thanks to Vivek for checking
> > this).
> >
> > So you can trick something to write() to it but you can't do
> > SO_PEERCGROUP on the other side, because it is not really a connected
> > socket, the connection is only faked on the sender side by constructing
> > sendmsg() messages with the original address passed into connect().
> >
> > So given this unfortunate circumstance, requiring the client to
> > explicitly pass cgroup data on unix datagram sockets may be an
> > acceptable request IMO.
> >
> > Perhaps this could be done with a sendmsg() header flag or simplified
> > ancillary data even, rather than forcing the sender process to retrieve
> > and construct the whole information which is already available in
> > kernel.
>
> So what would be the protocol here? When should somebody send an
> SCM_CGROUP message using sendmsg()?
I don't know how it will even be used for systemd logging case. systemd
provides various ways to connect stdout of services. So say a service's
stdout is connected to a connected datagram socket and all printf()
messages to stdout are being logged by receiver in journal. Now how
would sender know that it is supposed to send SCM_CGROUP? One needs
to modify printf() now?
Thanks
Vivek
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe netdev" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Powered by blists - more mailing lists