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Message-ID: <1398267458.2562.0.camel@flatline.rdu.redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 23 Apr 2014 11:37:38 -0400
From: Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>
To: Daniel J Walsh <dwalsh@...hat.com>
Cc: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@...hat.com>, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-audit@...hat.com,
selinux@...ho.nsa.gov, jamal@...atatu.com, davem@...emloft.net
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/6][v2] audit: implement multicast socket for journald
On Wed, 2014-04-23 at 11:36 -0400, Daniel J Walsh wrote:
> I guess the problem would be that the sysadm_t would be able to look at
> the journal which would now contain the audit content.
right. so include it in the sysadm_secadm bool
>
> On 04/23/2014 10:42 AM, Eric Paris wrote:
> > On Wed, 2014-04-23 at 09:40 -0400, Daniel J Walsh wrote:
> >> Here are the capabilities we currently give to sysadm_t with
> >> sysadm_secadm 1.0.0 Disabled
> >>
> >> allow sysadm_t sysadm_t : capability { chown dac_override
> >> dac_read_search fowner fsetid kill setgid setuid setpcap linux_immutable
> >> net_bind_service net_broadcast net_admin net_raw ipc_lock ipc_owner
> >> sys_rawio sys_chroot sys_ptrace sys_pacct sys_admin sys_boot sys_nice
> >> sys_resource sys_time sys_tty_config mknod lease audit_write setfcap } ;
> >> allow sysadm_t sysadm_t : capability { setgid setuid sys_chroot }
> >>
> >> allow sysadm_t sysadm_t : capability2 { syslog block_suspend } ;
> >>
> >> cap_audit_write might be a problem?
> > cap_audit_write is fine.
> >
> > syslogd_t (aka journal) is going to need the new permission
> > cap_audit_read. Also, as steve pointed out, someone may be likely to
> > want to be able to disable that permission easily.
> >
> > -Eric
> >
>
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