[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-Id: <20140423.153216.1388028648299605195.davem@davemloft.net>
Date: Wed, 23 Apr 2014 15:32:16 -0400 (EDT)
From: David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>
To: ebiederm@...ssion.com
Cc: vgoyal@...hat.com, ssorce@...hat.com, security@...nel.org,
luto@...capital.net, netdev@...r.kernel.org, serge@...lyn.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/6]: Preventing abuse when passing file descriptors
From: ebiederm@...ssion.com (Eric W. Biederman)
Date: Tue, 22 Apr 2014 14:13:43 -0700
> Andy Lutomirski when looking at the networking stack noticed that it is
> possible to trick privilged processes into calling write on a netlink
> socket and send netlink messages they did not intend.
>
> In particular from time to time there are suid applications that will
> write to stdout or stderr without checking exactly what kind of file
> descriptors those are and can be tricked into acting as a limited form
> of suid cat. In other conversations the magic string CVE-2014-0818 has
> been used to talk about this issue.
>
> This patchset cleans things up a bit, adds some clean abstractions that
> when used prevent this kind of problem and then finally changes all of
> the handlers of netlink messages that I could find that call capable
> to use netlink_ns_capable or an appropriate wrapper.
>
> The abstraction netlink_ns_capable verifies that the original creator
> of the netlink socket a message is sent from had the necessary
> capabilities as well as verifying that the current sender of a netlink
> packet has the necessary capabilities.
>
> The idea is to prevent file descriptor massing of any form from
> resulting in a file descriptor that can do more than it can for the
> creator of the file descriptor.
These patches were made against net-next, please rebase them against 'net'
and resubmit, thank you.
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe netdev" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Powered by blists - more mailing lists