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Message-ID: <CACLa4psQyoaZTE7R0qiog_biMKXyeGtLc1AQUuEPtemMYcDCSQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 24 Apr 2014 09:22:27 -0400
From: Eric Paris <eparis@...isplace.org>
To: Daniel J Walsh <dwalsh@...hat.com>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>,
Linux Netdev List <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
LSM List <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
linux-audit@...hat.com, SE-Linux <selinux@...ho.nsa.gov>,
jamal@...atatu.com, Steve Grubb <sgrubb@...hat.com>,
David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/6][v2] audit: implement multicast socket for journald
They would be equivalent if and only if journald had CAP_AUDIT_READ.
I suggest you take CAP_AUDIT_READ away from journald on systems which
need the secadm/sysadmin split (which is a ridiculously stupid split
anyway, but who am I to complain?)
On Wed, Apr 23, 2014 at 11:52 AM, Daniel J Walsh <dwalsh@...hat.com> wrote:
> Meaning looking at the journal would be equivalent to looking at
> /var/log/audit/audit.log.
>
>
> On 04/23/2014 11:37 AM, Eric Paris wrote:
>> On Wed, 2014-04-23 at 11:36 -0400, Daniel J Walsh wrote:
>>> I guess the problem would be that the sysadm_t would be able to look at
>>> the journal which would now contain the audit content.
>> right. so include it in the sysadm_secadm bool
>>
>>> On 04/23/2014 10:42 AM, Eric Paris wrote:
>>>> On Wed, 2014-04-23 at 09:40 -0400, Daniel J Walsh wrote:
>>>>> Here are the capabilities we currently give to sysadm_t with
>>>>> sysadm_secadm 1.0.0 Disabled
>>>>>
>>>>> allow sysadm_t sysadm_t : capability { chown dac_override
>>>>> dac_read_search fowner fsetid kill setgid setuid setpcap linux_immutable
>>>>> net_bind_service net_broadcast net_admin net_raw ipc_lock ipc_owner
>>>>> sys_rawio sys_chroot sys_ptrace sys_pacct sys_admin sys_boot sys_nice
>>>>> sys_resource sys_time sys_tty_config mknod lease audit_write setfcap } ;
>>>>> allow sysadm_t sysadm_t : capability { setgid setuid sys_chroot }
>>>>>
>>>>> allow sysadm_t sysadm_t : capability2 { syslog block_suspend } ;
>>>>>
>>>>> cap_audit_write might be a problem?
>>>> cap_audit_write is fine.
>>>>
>>>> syslogd_t (aka journal) is going to need the new permission
>>>> cap_audit_read. Also, as steve pointed out, someone may be likely to
>>>> want to be able to disable that permission easily.
>>>>
>>>> -Eric
>>>>
>>
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>>
>
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