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Message-Id: <20140507.194514.1312153135098382943.davem@davemloft.net>
Date: Wed, 07 May 2014 19:45:14 -0400 (EDT)
From: David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>
To: luto@...capital.net
Cc: jorge@...2.net, ebiederm@...ssion.com, vgoyal@...hat.com,
ssorce@...hat.com, security@...nel.org, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
serge@...lyn.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 5/5] net: Use netlink_ns_capable to verify the
permisions of netlink messages
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
Date: Wed, 7 May 2014 16:01:33 -0700
> On Wed, May 7, 2014 at 3:52 PM, David Miller <davem@...emloft.net> wrote:
>> From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
>> Date: Wed, 7 May 2014 15:26:11 -0700
>>
>>> So what do we do? Check permissions on connect and then use the
>>> cached result for send on a connected socket? Check permitted caps
>>> instead of effective caps?
>>
>> It should create the socket after changing perms.
>
> I agree that it should, but it doesn't, and if these patches get
> backported, things will break. OTOH, if the patches don't get
> backported, things may still break, and we have a possibly rather
> severe unfixed vulnerability.
I think the kernel change is justified as the privilege allowance
that happened before was very much unintentional and as you've
shown us countless times a very real problem that we must fix.
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