netdev - Re: [PATCH net] net: filter: x86: fix JIT address randomization

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Message-ID: <20140514073656.GA9848@osiris>
Date:	Wed, 14 May 2014 09:36:56 +0200
From:	Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@...ibm.com>
To:	Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...mgrid.com>
Cc:	"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
	Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
	Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@...hat.com>, netdev@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH net] net: filter: x86: fix JIT address randomization

On Tue, May 13, 2014 at 11:53:34AM -0700, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
> bpf_alloc_binary() adds 128 bytes of room to JITed program image
> and rounds it up to the nearest page size. If image size is close
> to page size (like 4000), it is rounded to two pages:
> round_up(4000 + 4 + 128) == 8192
> then 'hole' is computed as 8192 - (4000 + 4) = 4188
> If prandom_u32() % hole selects a number >= 4096, then kernel will crash
> during bpf_jit_free():

[...]

> Fixes: 314beb9bcabfd ("x86: bpf_jit_comp: secure bpf jit against spraying attacks")
> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...mgrid.com>
> ---
> 
> s390 commit aa2d2c73c21f ("s390/bpf,jit: address randomize and write protect jit code")
> seems to have the same problem

Yes, that's the same bug on s390. Would you mind fixing s390 as well, since I
assume you're going to send a new patch for x86?

Would be good to keep the code quite identical so these issues can be easily
seen across architectures.

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