netdev - Re: [Xen-devel] xen-netfront possibly rides the rocket too often

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Message-ID: <5374AF88.2070608@canonical.com>
Date:	Thu, 15 May 2014 14:14:00 +0200
From:	Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@...onical.com>
To:	Wei Liu <wei.liu2@...rix.com>,
	Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@...rix.com>
CC:	Zoltan Kiss <zoltan.kiss@...rix.com>,
	xen-devel@...ts.xenproject.org, netdev <netdev@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [Xen-devel] xen-netfront possibly rides the rocket too often

On 15.05.2014 13:04, Wei Liu wrote:
> On Thu, May 15, 2014 at 09:46:45AM +0100, Ian Campbell wrote:
>> On Wed, 2014-05-14 at 20:49 +0100, Zoltan Kiss wrote:
>>> On 13/05/14 19:21, Stefan Bader wrote:
>>>> We had reports about this message being seen on EC2 for a while but finally a
>>>> reporter did notice some details about the guests and was able to provide a
>>>> simple way to reproduce[1].
>>>>
>>>> For my local experiments I use a Xen-4.2.2 based host (though I would say the
>>>> host versions are not important). The host has one NIC which is used as the
>>>> outgoing port of a Linux based (not openvswitch) bridge. And the PV guests use
>>>> that bridge. I set the mtu to 9001 (which was seen on affected instance types)
>>>> and also inside the guests. As described in the report one guests runs
>>>> redis-server and the other nodejs through two scripts (for me I had to do the
>>>> two sub.js calls in separate shells). After a bit the error messages appear on
>>>> the guest running the redis-server.
>>>>
>>>> I added some debug printk's to show a bit more detail about the skb and got the
>>>> following (<length>@<offset (after masking off complete pages)>):
>>>>
>>>> [ 698.108119] xen_netfront: xennet: skb rides the rocket: 19 slots
>>>> [ 698.108134] header 1490@238 -> 1 slots
>>>> [ 698.108139] frag #0 1614@...4 -> + 1 pages
>>>> [ 698.108143] frag #1 3038@...6 -> + 2 pages
>>>> [ 698.108147] frag #2 6076@...2 -> + 2 pages
>>>> [ 698.108151] frag #3 6076@292 -> + 2 pages
>>>> [ 698.108156] frag #4 6076@...8 -> + 3 pages
>>>> [ 698.108160] frag #5 3038@...8 -> + 2 pages
>>>> [ 698.108164] frag #6 2272@...4 -> + 1 pages
>>>> [ 698.108168] frag #7 3804@0 -> + 1 pages
>>>> [ 698.108172] frag #8 6076@264 -> + 2 pages
>>>> [ 698.108177] frag #9 3946@...0 -> + 2 pages
>>>> [ 698.108180] frags adding 18 slots
>>>>
>>>> Since I am not deeply familiar with the networking code, I wonder about two things:
>>>> - is there something that should limit the skb data length from all frags
>>>>    to stay below the 64K which the definition of MAX_SKB_FRAGS hints?
>>> I think netfront should be able to handle 64K packets at most.
>>
>> Ah, maybe this relates to this fix from Wei?
>>
> 
> Yes, below patch limits SKB size to 64KB.  However the problem here is
> not SKB exceeding 64KB. The said SKB is acutally 43KB in size. The
> problem is that guest kernel is  using compound page so a frag which can
> be fit into one 4K page spans two 4K pages.  The fix seems to be
> coalescing SKB in frontend, but it will degrade performance.
> 
> Wei.
> 
Reading more of the code I would agree. The definition of MAX_SKB_FRAGS (at
least now with compound pages) cannot be used in any way to derive the number of
4k slots a transfer will require.

Zoltan already commented on worst cases. Not sure it would get as bad as that or
"just" 16*4k frags all in the middle of compound pages. That would then end in
around 33 or 34 slots, depending on the header.

Zoltan wrote:
> I think the worst case scenario is when every frag and the linear buffer contains 2 bytes,
> which are overlapping a page boundary (that's (17+1)*2=36 so far), plus 15 of
them have a 4k
> page in the middle of them, so, a 1+4096+1 byte buffer can span over 3 page.
> That's 51 individual pages.

I cannot claim to really know what to expect worst case. Somewhat I was thinking
of a
worst case of (16+1)*2, which would be inconvenient enough.

So without knowing exactly how to do it, but as Ian said it sounds best to come
up with some sort of exception coalescing in cases the slot count goes over 18
and we know the data size is below 64K.

-Stefan



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