netdev - Re: [Xen-devel] xen-netfront possibly rides the rocket too often

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Date:	Fri, 16 May 2014 12:17:48 +0200
From:	Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@...onical.com>
To:	Wei Liu <wei.liu2@...rix.com>
CC:	xen-devel@...ts.xenproject.org,
	Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@...rix.com>,
	Zoltan Kiss <zoltan.kiss@...rix.com>,
	netdev <netdev@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [Xen-devel] xen-netfront possibly rides the rocket too often

On 16.05.2014 12:09, Stefan Bader wrote:
> On 16.05.2014 11:48, Wei Liu wrote:
>> On Thu, May 15, 2014 at 02:14:00PM +0200, Stefan Bader wrote:
>> [...]
>>>> Wei.
>>>>
>>> Reading more of the code I would agree. The definition of MAX_SKB_FRAGS (at
>>> least now with compound pages) cannot be used in any way to derive the number of
>>> 4k slots a transfer will require.
>>>
>>> Zoltan already commented on worst cases. Not sure it would get as bad as that or
>>> "just" 16*4k frags all in the middle of compound pages. That would then end in
>>> around 33 or 34 slots, depending on the header.
>>>
>>> Zoltan wrote:
>>>> I think the worst case scenario is when every frag and the linear buffer contains 2 bytes,
>>>> which are overlapping a page boundary (that's (17+1)*2=36 so far), plus 15 of
>>> them have a 4k
>>>> page in the middle of them, so, a 1+4096+1 byte buffer can span over 3 page.
>>>> That's 51 individual pages.
>>>
>>> I cannot claim to really know what to expect worst case. Somewhat I was thinking
>>> of a
>>> worst case of (16+1)*2, which would be inconvenient enough.
>>>
>>> So without knowing exactly how to do it, but as Ian said it sounds best to come
>>> up with some sort of exception coalescing in cases the slot count goes over 18
>>> and we know the data size is below 64K.
>>>
>>
>> I took a stab at it this morning and came up with this patch. Ran
>> redis-benchmark, it seemed to fix that for me -- only saw one "failed to
>> linearize skb" during
>>
>>   redis-benchmark -h XXX -d 1000 -t lrange
>>
>> And before this change, a lot of "rides rocket" were triggered.
>>
>> Thought?
> 
> It appears at least to me as something that nicely makes use of existing code. I
> was wondering about what could or could not be used. Trying to get ones head
> around the whole thing is kind of a lot to look at.
> 
> The change at least looks straight forward enough.

The only woe for me is that I am looking puzzled at the implementation of
skb_linearize(). Somehow the data_len element decides whether a skb can be
linearized and basically how much it tries to pull from the tail. It probably
makes sense ... just not to me with not deep experience here.

-Stefan


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