netdev - Re: [RFC][PATCH] netlink: Only check file credentials for implicit destinations

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Message-ID: <5382FD93.8090106@gmail.com>
Date:	Mon, 26 May 2014 10:38:43 +0200
From:	"Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)" <mtk.manpages@...il.com>
To:	Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
CC:	mtk.manpages@...il.com, "Jorge Boncompte [DTI2]" <jorge@...2.net>,
	Jiri Benc <jbenc@...hat.com>,
	David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>,
	Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@...hat.com>,
	Simo Sorce <ssorce@...hat.com>,
	"security@...nel.org" <security@...nel.org>,
	Network Development <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH] netlink: Only check file credentials for implicit
 destinations

On 05/25/2014 06:50 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Sat, May 24, 2014 at 10:38 PM, Eric W. Biederman
> <ebiederm@...ssion.com> wrote:
>>
>> It was possible to get a setuid root or setcap executable to write to
>> it's stdout or stderr (which has been set made a netlink socket) and
>> inadvertently reconfigure the networking stack.
>>
>> To prevent this we check that both the creator of the socket and
>> the currentl applications has permission to reconfigure the network
>> stack.
>>
>> Unfortunately this breaks Zebra which always uses sendto/sendmsg
>> and creates it's socket without any privileges.
>>
>> To keep Zebra working don't bother checking if the creator of the
>> socket has privilege when a destination address is specified.  Instead
>> rely exclusively on the privileges of the sender of the socket.
>>
> 
> Cute.
> 
>> +       NETLINK_SKB_DST         = 0x8,          /* Packet not socket destination */
> 
> How about "sendto/sendmsg with explicit destination"
> 
> Whatever we settle on, I think this'll need to end up in the man
> pages.  Cc: Michael Kerrisk.  I hereby volunteer to write something
> up.
> 
> Michael, for background: Pre-linux-3.15, sending netlink messages to
> the kernel checked the credentials of the sender.  This is a security
> bug: the sender might be a setuid-root program with stdout or stderr
> redirected to a netlink socket (or an SCM_RIGHTS user, etc).

Andy, thanks for putting your hand-up, and thanks especially
for paragraph of background. (Too often, I get CCed into a thread
with the implication that something needs to be fixed in man-pages
without any explanation of what or why.)

Cheers,

Michael



> The proposal in this patch is that doing privileged things using a
> netlink socket will require the sender to have capabilities and
> (either sendto/sendmsg with an explicit destination or a connected
> socket that was created by a privileged user).
> 
> This is still not great from a security POV: if you can get a hold of
> a privileged socket (i.e. a socket created with CAP_NET_ADMIN
> available), then you can connect it and try to attack the kernel.
> This issue would go away if we hooked netlink_connect.  I can try
> writing up that version of the patch tomorrow.
> 
> --Andy
> 


-- 
Michael Kerrisk
Linux man-pages maintainer; http://www.kernel.org/doc/man-pages/
Linux/UNIX System Programming Training: http://man7.org/training/
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